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Preface
I worked as a clinical embryologist for several years, during 
which time many new techniques, including preimplantation genetic 
diagnosis, were developed. The Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
Authority was also established and the new laws implemented.
I became interested in the ethical implications of these 
techniques and this thesis is an attempt to explain how people, both 
clinical staff and patients, justify their use of them.
Abstract
Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis is a fairly new form of 
prenatal diagnosis, which screens for genetic disease at the embryonic 
stage. Its use is expanding as more knowledge is gained about genetic 
disorders and tests for the causative genes are developed.
I examine how its use can be justified and which disorders are 
suitable candidates. These disorders could be ones that would confer an 
intolerable life on anyone with them. Chapter 1 discusses what could be 
regarded as an intolerable life by considering health: what it is, how we 
measure it and how the courts have regarded it. Chapter 2 then 
considers what other genetic factors could be screened for, and 
whether these would be justifiable uses of the technique.
Chapter 3 discusses how disability is viewed in society, the 
problems faced by people with impairments, and how the disability 
movement has argued it should be viewed. In chapter 4 ,1 examine the 
medicalisation of society, the eugenics movement and the medical view 
of disability.
Finally I discuss the status of the embryo and foetus with 
regard to human rights and how this affects the practice of 
Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis.
3
Table of Contents
In troduction ..........................................................................................................6
The nature of P G D ................................................................................................ 7
Chapter 1.................................................................................................................9
1.1 PGD: a justification of its use...........................................................................9
1.2 Health & Welfare Interests...............................................................................9
1.2.1 Models of health................................................................... 10
1.2.2 Positive health....................................................................... 13
1.2.3 Welfare Interests................................................................... 15
1.3 Legal criteria....................................................................................................23
1.4 Health Measurements.................................................................................... 30
1.5 Conclusions.................................................................. 42
Chapter 2 ............................................................................................................. 45
Medical screening and PGD as a screening too l................................................45
2.1 Medical Screening..........................................................................................45
2.2 PGD as a screening tool................................................................................53
2.2.1 Sex Selection..........................................................................54
2.2.2 Non-disease genetic traits.....................................................57
2.2.3 Conclusions...........................................................................59
2.3 Deafness - a candidate for PGD?.................................................................. 61
Chapter 3 ............................................................................................................. 67
PGD as a means of eradicating disability........................................................... 67
3.1 Societal health.................................................................................................67
3.2 Social model of disability................................................................................69
3.2.1 Education...............................................................................70
3.2.2 Employment..........................................................................75
4
3.2.3 Social welfare......................................................................... 77
3.2.4 Housing..................................................................................80
3.2.5 Conclusions...........................................................................82
Chapter 4 ............................................................................................................. 84
4.1 Medicine as technology...................................................................................84
4.2 Eugenics.......................................................................................................... 91
4.3 The medical model of disability................................................................... 106
Chapter 5 ............................................................................................................ I ll
The status and rights of the embryo.................................................................. I l l
5.1 The status of the embryo..............................................................................I l l
5.2 Human Rights............................................................................................... 116
5.3 Conclusions...................................................................................................118
Conclusions....................................................................................................... 119
5
Introduction
Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis (PGD) is a method of 
testing for the presence or absence of genetic disorders. It is a form of 
Prenatal diagnosis (PND) but, rather than testing after the pregnancy 
has begun as in chorionic villus sampling or amniocentesis, it tests 
embryos before implantation. It is performed after In-Vitro 
Fertilisation (IVF) once the embryos have reached the 8 cell stage. A 
single cell is removed from the embryo and this is then tested for the 
presence or absence of a specific gene, or in the case of X-linked 
diseases, for the sex of that embryo.
By assessing what type of disorders could be suitable for 
PGD, I will try to provide a justification for its use of the sort that 
professionals in the field would find acceptable, and what sort of 
justification this may be.
I will begin by considering that justification to be one of 
stopping those who would have an intolerable life from being born and 
consider what constitutes such an intolerable life. I will then examine 
the fears that allowing PGD in these instances will lead on to testing for 
genetic traits or sex selection, moving on to more general societal 
worries which I have categorised as the sanitisation and medicalisation 
of society. Lasdy I will consider PGD with regard to the sanctity of life 
principle.
I hope to show that PGD is an acceptable technique for the 
prevention of genetic disorders, but only those which confer an 
intolerable level of suffering on any affected individual. I also hope to 
provide, through consideration of what constitutes an intolerable life, a 
basis for decisions as to which disorders would fit into this category,
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and suggest that the use of such a basis would prevent the technique 
being used for social reasons.
The nature of PGD
PGD is a technique for identifying a specific genetic disorder 
by using molecular biological techniques such as Polymerase Chain 
Reaction (PCR) or chromosomal analysis such as fluorescence 
techniques (FISH) or in the case of X-linked disorders, using FISH to 
identify the sex of the embryos.
IVF is the first step, with eggs harvested after superovulation 
and mixed with sperm from the partner. 48 hours later, when the 
fertilised eggs have reached the 8 cell stage, 1 or 2 cells are removed. 
This procedure requires a high level of skill to remove a single cell 
without damaging the embryo, and also requires that the embryos 
themselves are of good quality.
These cells are then individually tested using the techniques 
mentioned and the given gene identified as absent or present, or the sex 
of the embryo determined. The embryos that are free from the affected 
gene are then replaced as they would be after routine IVF, and those 
that carry it are discarded. In the case of X-linked disorders, the 
embryos are sexed and only female (XX) embryos cleared for 
replacement - thus all male (XY) embryos, whether they are affected or 
not, are discarded.
The genetic tests require high levels of technical expertise as 
the amount of biological material is very small, and they must also be 
highly accurate to ensure that no affected embryos are replaced. The 
whole procedure must be carried out within a very limited time scale as 
the embryos need to be biopsied, tested and replaced within 24 hours.
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Most of the patients for PGD have come through the genetic 
counselling service, and have been alerted to their condition by having 
an affected child, having repeated terminations after pre-natal 
screening, recurrent miscarriage or another family member affected by 
the disorder. Thus all of them have experience of the disorder at first 
hand and face the option of not having children, risking to nature and 
possibly having another affected child or repeatedly going through 
PND and terminating affected pregnancies.
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Chapter 1
1.1 PGD: a justification of its use
There are two scientific factors in deciding that a disorder is a 
suitable candidate for PGD: the aetiology and pathology of the disorder 
itself, and the technical aspects. In other words is the causative gene 
identifiable and, more importantly, is a reliable test for it available?
The technical aspects I don’t intend to go into in depth - as I 
have said the technique requires skilled embryological staff to carry out 
the biopsy and the genetic tests must be efficacious. These are 
requirements of the licensing body in the UK, the Human Fertilisation 
and Embryology Authority (HFEA), and necessary for obtaining a 
licence to practice PGD.
The aetiological and pathological aspects concern the disease 
process of the disorder. If these would confer an intolerable life on 
someone affected by that disorder, then it would be a suitable candidate 
for PGD.
If the justification of PGD, and PND a whole, is to prevent 
the birth of those who would have an intolerable life such as it would 
be better that they were not born, then one must have some idea of 
what constitutes an intolerable life.
By looking at various ways of defining health (1.2), welfare 
interests (1.2.3), relevant legal decisions (1.3), and methods of health 
measurement (1.4), I will consider how these help identify factors 
which constitute an intolerable life.
1.2 Health & Welfare Interests
The concept of health can be regarded in a number of 
varying ways, the discussion of which can be divided into 2 main
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sections - a narrow, negative ‘absence of disease’ view and a wider, 
positive view of overall health and well-being. The negative, narrow 
view is described by various models, discussed below. The broader state 
of well-being which some would equate with that of good health is not 
an entirely clear concept in that health in its narrow sense and well­
being, as I shall discuss later, do not always go together. One often 
describes someone as in good ‘health’ when describing this broad, 
positive view, and so the terms appear interchangeable. Thus there can 
be considered to be a state of overall ‘health’ which is a combination of 
good health as defined in the narrow sense and a positive sense of well­
being.
I will discuss the broad view of health, embodied in the 
WHO definition of health, ‘health is a state of complete physical, 
mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease’1 
later in the chapter, and then consider it in relation to basic ‘welfare 
interests’.
1.2.1 Models of health
In terms of the narrower descriptions of health, I will 
consider 4 models of health, all of which depend on the absence or 
presence of some state. They describe health as:
1. Absence of disease or illness.
2. A normal state.
3. A stable state.
4. Freedom from pain or suffering.
Firstly, health can be described as absence of disease or 
illness, such that anyone who is free from a definable disease or illness
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will be adjudged healthy. But there are instances where the presence or 
absence of illness does not imply a ‘healthy’ state, such as a mild skin 
disorder or Rubella which has been diagnosed but remains 
symptomless. In the terms of this model, sufferers from these diseases 
would be unhealthy but in other views, including their own, they may 
be seen to be ‘healthy.’ Alternatively, someone may feel themselves to 
be in poor health but have no definable or diagnosable disease. This 
view of health is dependent on the definition of disease or illness which 
it has been argued is ‘a value judgement, relatively unproblematic in 
cases where it is widely shared, but more contentious when people 
disagree about it.’2 Sickness becomes a role negotiated with society, and 
‘this will depend on societal attitudes as to what constitutes a 
reasonable human life’3 e.g. obtaining sick leave from work is 
negotiated between oneself and your doctor.
Secondly, ill-health could be considered as an abnormal state, 
where physiological and/or psychological functions are not operating 
as they should. This gives a mechanistic view of health so that, just as 
one takes a car to a garage to be repaired if it is not working properly, 
any abnormal functioning of the body means a visit to the medical 
workshop for repair. This view is based on 2 assumptions - that there is 
such a thing as a ‘normal’ state to which one can be returned, and that 
loss of function is an unhealthy state.
The notion of ‘normality’ is not the same for all however - 
many people do not have perfect eyesight and use corrective measures 
to compensate, such as glasses or contact lenses, but they are not 
generally considered to be unhealthy. Some people can throw a ball 
accurately, or hit it with a racquet - a level of ‘normal’ hand eye co­
ordination but those that can’t are not unhealthy, just poor sportsmen.
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In this model, disabilities are abnormal states - someone who 
is blind cannot be said to have all their physiological functions working 
normally. Many blind people however would not consider themselves 
to be in ill health. The idea of normal functioning must be linked to 
those functions which are required to lead a ‘normal’ life within a given 
society - what purpose does the function have in our life, how 
important that purpose is, and whether lack of it can be compensated 
for in such a way that a ‘normal’ life can be lived without it. Someone 
who is blind can, with assistance, utilise their environment, live 
independendy and be generally in good health. In the strict sense of this 
model they are in an abnormal state but to them that is their usual, and 
in that sense their normal, state in that it does not prevent normal 
everyday life.
Thirdly, perhaps if we consider health to be a stable state, this 
may give a more complete picture. No matter what the physiological 
and/or psychological state, if it is stable then that constitutes health for 
that individual. Illness is then regarded as an unstable state requiring 
treatment to regain stability.
If someone has no use of their legs, they could be considered 
in a stable state unless they suffered from an additional illness or 
disease which would require treatment to return them to their original 
state. They may be in a wheelchair and require assistance in day to day 
living but that for them is their normal, stable state.
In this model however there is a possibility that one could be 
in a stable state of poor health, perhaps with a chronic heart problem 
which makes someone housebound or unable to climb stairs. This 
could be a stable state, unchanging for years, yet one would not 
consider them to be in glowing health.
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The final model of health is that of freedom from pain or 
suffering, both of which may prevent someone from doing what they 
want or need to do in their lives. In this case, medicine would be hoped 
to be able to control the pain, find the cause or make it bearable to an 
extent that the person could get on with their lives. But an acceptable 
level of pain is a very individual thing, and someone with chronic pain 
may be able to bear it and continue their lives normally. A better model 
might then be freedom from unbearable pain or untreatable pain such 
that it interferes with normal living.
1.2.2 Positive health
These models of health concentrate narrowly on negative 
aspects of health, whereas if we return to the WHO definition this 
implies an additional sense of overall well-being, a more positive 
concept. This idea of health and well-being as an ideal to be sought 
after was promoted by the ancient Greeks. The Alexandrian physician 
Herophilos summed this view up, saying, ‘when health is absent, 
wisdom cannot reveal itself, art cannot become manifest, strength 
cannot fight, wealth becomes useless and intelligence cannot be 
applied/4 If we consider that he is talking about health in its negative 
sense, then he sees this as a necessary requirement for the greater 
concept of a ‘good’ life. This supports the idea of overall health as a 
positive summation of all aspects of life, with negative health as a 
component.
This view covers not just the physical dimension of health, 
but the mental and social components too. Mental and physical well­
being may be dependent on absence of disease or illness but the whole 
well-being of an individual is greatly reliant on many other social and
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environmental factors. To attain overall health all these factors must 
come together.
The social aspect of health are concerned with one’s 
relationships, the environment in which one lives and works, the ease 
with which one can access and use that environment and the financial 
ability to maintain oneself, one’s environment and utilise it.
To do so, one requires the ability to have control over these 
factors, an ability which ‘arises from and reflects a process of 
empowerment.’5 People need to be enabled to make the most of their 
environment and life in order to attain good health and well-being. The 
environmental and social aspects of health can be seen as health 
‘determinants’6 leading to, or responsible for poor health - physically 
and mentally through poor housing conditions, inadequate finances and 
a feeling of lack of control over events. These are societal problems 
which can lead to medical ones which constitute poor health. Medical 
problems can also lead to social problems which may further 
compound a state of poor health. If one has a disease or disability 
considered unacceptable or incompatible with employment, then one 
will not have the means to improve one’s social environment.
In a different expression of the idea of empowerment leading 
to good health, Aaron Antonovsky7 has proposed health as dependent 
on what he terms a ‘sense of coherence’ theory. This involves the ability 
to comprehend information or problems in life in an ordered way, 
having the resources available to meet the demands of this information, 
and a meaningfulness in life which gives one a sense that some of the 
demands made on us are worth putting energy into. Thus he says that if 
someone has a good sense of coherence, or a good ability to sort 
problems in life and deal with them, this will in turn lead to a state of
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good overall health. He sees this coping ability as a prerequisite for 
overall health, equatable with a sense of well-being or satisfaction with 
life.
As I mentioned in the introductory paragraph of this chapter, 
the state of well-being does not always correlate with one’s health 
status. Poor health will not always equate to poor well-being - someone 
with terminal cancer may be entirely at peace with themselves, their 
family and their situation, perhaps describable as a state of well-being, 
but one would not say they were in the best of health. Similarly if 
someone is confined to a wheelchair, unable to walk and requiring 
assistance with their day to day life, they would not be considered to be 
in good health by some. If they have good support from their 
community, appropriate assistance and an accessible environment, in 
other words enabled to live to the fullness of their capabilities, then 
they may be in a state of well-being.
This view of overall health has negatively defined health as a 
component, but also depends on well-being, social and environmental 
factors all combining at their optimum levels.
1.2.3 Welfare Interests
To consider another view of well-being which involves many 
of the models of health discussed earlier, Feinberg has stated that there 
are basic welfare interests,8 the harming of which constitutes the 
greatest wrong. He regards these as interests 'whose satisfaction is 
known to be indispensable to a decent life.’9 He lists them as:
1. Continuance for a foreseeable interval of one’s life
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2. One’s own physical health and vigour
3. Integrity & normal functioning of one’s body
4. Absence of absorbing pain and suffering or grotesque 
disfigurement
5. Minimal intellectual acuity
6. Emotional stability
7. Absence of groundless anxieties and resentments
8. Capacity to engage normally in social intercourse and to enjoy 
and maintain friendships.
9. Minimal income and financial security
10. Tolerable social and physical environment
11. Certain amount of freedom from interference and coercion.
We can consider these in conjunction with the WHO 
definition of health, 'health is a state of complete physical, mental and 
social well-being and not merely the absence of disease.’10 Fitting the list 
of basic welfare interests in with this statement, the first 4 are 
concerned with physical well-being, number 5 -8  mental well-being, 
and the last 3 to do with social health.
Firsdy, continuance of life for a foreseeable interval - the 
ability to know that one’s life will continue so that you can plan for the 
future and try to direct it in such a way that will enable you to reach 
your potential. For children, they have plans made for them, are 
educated, kept warm and fed by their parents in the knowledge that this 
will give them a basis from which to carry on their own lives and have 
options available to them. If you were born knowing that your life
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would only be 4 years long, this long term planning would be denied, if 
not to oneself, then to one’s parents.
But it is often said that one doesn’t know what lies ahead - 
the well known statement that ‘you could be hit by a bus tomorrow’ 
encapsulates this. So we continually make plans and work towards a 
future which is by no means a certainty, and of which we really know 
very litde. If one is born with only a remote chance of reaching 
adulthood, then there is still an amount of life to live and plan for, the 
denial of which may be of greater harm to one’s interests than not 
having an unlimited future. It may in fact be of greater harm to the 
parents as they will be aware of the facts from an early stage, know that 
a limidess future is not possible, and this will undoubtedly alter their 
perceptions of the child. It may be argued that as there is a limited 
future, why invest time and money into it. Certainly when an individual 
is born in such circumstances, and for their early years, they will be 
entirely unaware of their limited future and so it is debatable whether 
they are harmed by the fact.
One’s own physical health and vigour, the next welfare 
interest, could be taken as a statement of the ancient view of health or 
overall well-being. Can this ever be achievable as an aim? One can be in 
good health, free from any identifiable illness or disease but this added 
notion of well-being is dependent on many other external factors. As 
good health or poor health is a value judgement, one could be said to 
be only as healthy as the person assessing you thinks you are. It would 
be very difficult to assess the ability to attain an ideal of well-being at 
birth - there are plenty of healthy babies who go on to have no notion 
of health later in life. An assessment of the potential for health and 
well-being may be possible but the complete view of overall health 
involves so many extraneous factors that attainment of health is
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difficult to predict. There may be circumstances where it may appear 
obvious that no level of acceptable health is possible and this may be 
viewed as a harming of one’s interests, but as always this is a judgement 
based on the judge’s view of health.
Integrity and functioning of one’s body leads to the 
mechanistic view of health, where good health stems from intact 
physiological and psychological functioning. As stated earlier, this view 
is based on an assumption of normal functioning, the purpose of the 
function and whether it is necessary for everyday life. Certainly an 
anencephalic baby would be considered abnormal as it has no 
functioning brain and to keep it alive would be considered harming its 
interests. But if one considers a baby born with Cystic Fibrosis where 
their respiratory system will not function normally without daily 
treatment - admittedly not pleasant but is it a harming of their interests? 
With adequate treatment there are many people with Cystic Fibrosis 
who have a productive and normal life.
The fourth welfare interest to consider is that of absence of 
pain and suffering or grotesque disfigurement - this can be dependent 
on the ability of medicine to treat and alleviate the pain or correct any 
disfigurement, and the amount of interference with normal living that 
they cause. In terms of disfigurement, there is a judgement as to 
acceptability. A baby born with a cleft palate, which can be a major 
disfigurement and affect development through feeding problems, will 
be considered acceptable and treatable, even though there may still be a 
degree of disfigurement after treatment. Many children born after their 
mothers took thalidomide during pregnancy are certainly disfigured but 
many would argue that they have been able to lead productive and 
useful lives - a measure of good well-being. With regard to pain, there 
may be certain conditions which entail some amount of pain and
18
suffering, and what may be acceptable or bearable for one individual 
may not be so for others. The knowledge of certain pain in childbirth 
has certainly not stopped people from reproducing. Some regard 
childbirth as acceptable only without any form of pain relief, others 
only with total relief. Thus there should be caution in assessing what is 
an acceptable or bearable level of pain or suffering for any given 
individual.
The mental aspects of health, covered by the next 4 welfare 
interests are possibly even more difficult to evaluate.
The possession of minimal intellectual acuity is considered to 
be a requirement for a decent life. An anencephalic baby with no 
functioning brain will never be able to have intellectual acuity of any 
kind, but a baby with Down’s syndrome will develop some level of 
intellectual ability. In some cases there will be a need for total care 
throughout life, but in others, given appropriate assistance and 
education, a contented and self-sufficient life may be attainable.
On a higher level of intellectual ability, there can be variation 
in what is regarded as normal within families. Thus where expectation is 
low, having enough intellectual capacity to obtain and keep a job will be 
considered an acceptable norm, but in other families, university 
education will be normal. These are certainly not comparable with 
anencephaly or Down’s syndrome but do show the wide range of what 
is considered normal intellectual ability.
Emotional stability is an exceptionally arbitrary quality to 
assess or measure, and even more so when considering the potential 
children. A minimal intellectual ability is arguably a prerequisite for 
being able to consider one’s emotional state. But to return to children 
with Down’s syndrome many are contented, either through lack of
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awareness of their situation or their innocence regarding future 
problems, and thus in a stable emotional state. One’s environment and 
circumstances are also implicated in emotional stability, and in the case 
of PGD and PND, the prospective parents. As social services have 
found in many cases, to their and their clients cost, the emotional 
stability of parents is difficult to assess or predict. Several IVF 
programmes in the UK have included being in a long-term stable 
relationship as part of their requirements for acceptance for treatment. 
They have found however, not surprisingly, that this is almost 
impossible to quantify and given the high numbers of people who 
divorce following IVF treatment, perhaps impossible to judge.
The next 2 welfare interests - absence of groundless anxieties 
and resentments and a capacity to engage normally in social intercourse 
may be regarded as capacities of anyone with minimal intellectual 
acuity. When looked at from the viewpoint of potential children as in 
PGD and PND, both will be very difficult to predict. To take 2 
examples - Down’s syndrome children may be contented and happy in 
a well supported environment, free from anxieties and often with a 
great ability to enjoy friendships although not all their behaviour may 
be seen as acceptable to all.
Autistic children, on the other hand, may develop many 
anxieties about themselves and their environment. In general they will 
have various difficulties in engaging normally social intercourse and in 
many cases, even with extensive help and special education, those 
affected will never be able to do so.
Any potential child has to be assessed for social abilities 
bearing in mind the possibilities through education and assistance, and 
the inability to predict other problems which may appear at later stages.
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The 3 welfare interests which remain will be considered in 
relation to the social model of disability in chapter 3.
By considering overall health as a combination of physical, 
social and mental factors, it can be difficult to assess in the living, and 
even more so in potential people as is required in PND and PGD.
In assessing disorders suitable for 'treatment’ through PND 
and PGD, one has to use clinical expertise and experience of those 
born with given disorders, but given the wide variation of clinical 
symptoms within any disorder, a consensus may be hard to reach. 
Doctors may be influenced by their ability to treat a disorder, if they 
cannot then they will be more inclined to think of it as unacceptable or 
intolerable.
The experience of families coming for PGD especially will 
also be useful in that they will usually have first hand knowledge of the 
disorder affecting them. This experience may however have been of a 
particularly harrowing nature or very mild.
All assessment of health and well-being is a judgement based 
on values - what is considered 'good’ or 'normal’ to the assessor. These 
values will reflect their own experiences and those of society as a whole.
There are certain conditions which could be regarded as 
unacceptable by all, where the life would be 'intolerable’. Lesch-nyman 
syndrome for example where life is shortened, with no capacity for self- 
help and little treatment that can alleviate symptoms. The majority 
would take this to be an intolerable form of life. There are a whole 
category of other disorders, however, which to some people would be 
acceptable.
The list of welfare interests is useful as a basic checklist of the 
components of what is considered an acceptable, ‘decent’ life but any
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assessment of health and well-being, especially when it is that of a 
potential life, must be viewed not as a scientific, clear cut decision, but 
rather one laden with the values and attitudes of doctors, parents and 
society.
Overall health is thus a series of value judgements, being 
made up of the narrow, model based health as an absence of disease or 
abnormality, social, mental and environmental factors and a sense of 
well-being. It is certainly a confusing term as seen by the various 
examples above, and the fact that we use the word health in so many 
different ways in everyday speech. Regarded as this overall concept it 
becomes evident how difficult it is to say what another person’s health 
status is, and even more difficult to predict what it will be in the future.
In terms of the models of health, these involve judgements 
on what is a disease and what is a normal, stable state. When these 
judgements are combined with all the other factors, including well­
being and good coping mechanisms, it is evident that overall health is 
not just an elusive concept but actually very hard to attain in life. 
Viewed from this way, health for an able-bodied person is just as 
difficult as it is for those with disabilities so we should be careful in our 
judgement of an intolerable life - someone who has no disabilities but 
lives in poor housing, with poor social support and no sense of control 
over their life may be in a far worse state of health than someone with 
Down’s syndrome who lives in a supportive environment, had 
appropriate education and is thus enabled to live their lives to the best 
of their ability.
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1.3 Legal criteria
Legally there have been several cases where the idea of an 
‘intolerable’ life has been pertinent. These cases have displayed that 
there are certain basic qualities that the law considers to be essential 
factors in being alive and human. In rej u, where a child was born 
prematurely and suffering from severe and permanent brain damage, it 
was decided that medical treatment was not to be continued because of 
the child’s quality of life. They stated that ‘there must be extreme cases 
in which the court is entided to say: “The life which this treatment 
would prolong would be so cruel as to be intolerable’” and went on to 
consider ‘At what point in the scale of suffering and disability ought the
court to hold that the best interests of the child do not require.....
treatment to prolong its life.’
In an opposite decision, the case of reB 12, where the child 
was born with Down’s syndrome and required surgery, they ordered 
the operation because the child’s existence was going to be acceptable. 
They put it as ‘there is no evidence that this child’s short life is likely to 
be an intolerable one. There is no evidence at all as to the quality of life 
which the child may expect.’ So in terms of children already born the 
courts have said that the tolerability and prediction of tolerability of the 
life has a major part to play in their decisions. This does not just have 
to do with pain and suffering either, as was stated categorically in the 
case of Airedale NHS Trust v Bland13 in which a young man was left in 
a persistent vegetative state (PVS) after the Hillsborough disaster and 
the courts were asked to consider whether treatment should be 
continued. On deciding that treatment should not be continued, they 
said ‘To limit the quality of life to extreme pain is to take a demeaning 
view of a human being.’ 14
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Cases of wrongful life’ and wrongful birth’ are even more 
controversial and more relevant to PND and PGD. In both instances, 
damages are sought for the birth of an unwanted and/or harmed child. 
The case of ‘wrongful life’ is one that is brought by the child himself, 
and these have not been considered favourably by the law either here or 
in the US. Their reason for this is that it would require the child to say 
that its life is so unfavourable that it would have been better not to 
have been born as non-existence is their only alternative.
In the UK the only case of this type was McKay v Essex15 
where a child was born handicapped following his mother’s infection 
with Rubella during her pregnancy. The court found no negligence as 
the guilty party was the rubella virus. They said that for the case to 
succeed, it would be on the ‘basis of a right not to be born deformed or 
disabled, which in the case of a child deformed or disabled before birth 
by nature or disease meant a right to be aborted.’16 They accorded the 
foetus no such right, and also held that the doctor had no legal 
obligation to terminate a pregnancy. In conclusion they said, ‘such a 
claim for wrongful life would be contrary to public policy as a violation 
of the sanctity of human life.’17
This judgement was in line with, and owed a great deal to, the 
case of Gleitman v Cosgrove18 in the US. This also involved a Rubella 
infection during pregnancy which caused handicap. They ruled that 
‘they cannot weigh the value of life with impairments against the non­
existence of life itself.’19 and stated that ‘A child must not be perfect to 
have a worthwhile life.’20 In a forerunner of the comments in McKay, 
they felt there were ‘substantial policy reasons’ for not ‘allowing tort 
damages for the denial of an opportunity to take an embryonic life.’21
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The Law Commission in 1974, after Gleitman v Cosgrove but 
before McKay, felt that ‘such a course of action [wrongful life cases], if 
it existed, would place an intolerable burden on medical advisors in 
their socially and morally exacting role. The danger that Doctors would 
be under subconscious pressure to advise abortions in doubtful cases 
through fear of an action of damages is, we think, a real one.’ 22
Thus the action brought by the harmed child, unless 
applicable under the Congenital Disabilities Act23, is one that is not 
likely to succeed. The policy that they appear afraid of creating, 
however, would appear to be consistent with the policy apparently 
created by PND and PGD today.
In the action of ‘wrongful birth5, the case is brought by the 
parents of an unwanted and/or harmed child. These have consisted of 
failed sterilisation cases where the child has been born healthy or 
impaired and the failure to warn of disability and advise of a risk in time 
for abortion to be an option.
The failed sterilisation cases have varied in their outcomes 
and date from Christensen v Thornby24 in the US in 1934. In this case 
the court felt that the birth of a healthy child was a blessing which 
conferred benefit and this was to be balanced against the perceived 
harm of an unwanted child. In this instance they decided that the 
operation was unconnected to the birth of the child and ruled against 
damages. This view of the child as a benefit has been a common theme 
throughout these cases, but as was pointed out in the Thake v Maurice 
case, ‘every baby has a belly to be filled and a body to be clothed’25. 
Consequently the courts have usually awarded costs for the birth, loss 
of earnings and upkeep of the child as in Thake v Maurice. In a more 
recent case of this kind however, McFarlane v Tayside Health Board26,
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which went to the House of Lords, they decided on an economic law 
that the NHS was not liable for the cost of rearing a child, only for the 
pregnancy and birth. The court did not see an economic duty on a hard 
pressed NHS to pay for the upbringing of a healthy child.
Subsequently, in the case of Parkinson v St James & Seacroft 
University Hospital NHS trust27 the court awarded damages for the 
extra cost of bringing up a disabled child. In this case the sterilisation 
had been performed negligendy and although the mother had been 
warned during the pregnancy that the child might be born with a 
disability, she decided not to terminate. The child was born with severe 
communication and behavioural difficulties. The court did not allow 
basic maintenance costs to the mother but specifically awarded costs 
for the additional expense associated with rearing a child with 
disabilities.
In the case of a child born damaged or handicapped, which 
doesn’t come under the remit of the Congenital Disability Act, costs 
have been awarded for the pregnancy, birth and upkeep of the child. In 
McLelland v Greater Glasgow Health Board28, they went further and 
awarded damages to the father for the shock of having a child with 
Down’s syndrome. In this case, there was a failure to offer an 
amniocentesis in the light of a family history of Down’s. In this case 
too, the health board admitted liability.
In Salih v Enfield Health Authority29 the parents defence was 
that they wanted a child but the cost of bringing up a handicapped child 
was not something that they wanted.
These cases are based on the assumption that if the parents 
had known of the risk of disability, they would have aborted the 
pregnancy. This brings us back to the case of McKay, where the court
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did not want to encourage a public policy of favouring abortion over 
birth. I will discuss this later with reference to the aims of the medical 
genetics service in the UK.
The Congenital Disabilities Act states that there is a duty not 
to harm the foetus through surgery during pregnancy or negligence 
which affects either parent’s ability to have unaffected children.
The question of compensation for having a disabled child 
where there is no negligence except a natural or genetic causative agent 
is still an awkward case for the courts. On the one hand they are saying 
they don’t want to encourage a policy of abortion over birth, but on the 
other they seem willing to compensate for not providing an opportunity 
to do so. It appears that the woman’s right to choice and a greater 
acceptance of abortion is swaying this policy toward PND and 
abortion. In addition, after the Parkinson case they seem to 
acknowledge the extra cost of bringing up a child with a disability and 
view it as something that should be compensated for.
Mason and McCall Smith have said that ‘The disabled should 
be helped and if possible compensated for their suffering but the moral 
basis of such compensation should be the desire to make their lives 
more comfortable and bearable - not the notion that they shouldn’t 
exist’ 30
Although the ‘wrongful life’ cases have been discouraged on 
the grounds of encouraging abortion, by awarding damages for having a 
disabled child the courts are reinforcing the view that this is a thing to 
be avoided and by awarding damages for the extra cost of rearing a 
disabled child appear to acknowledge that the state provision is 
inadequate. In many cases the causal agent has been nature but by not 
providing an opportunity to find this out in time to terminate the
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pregnancy, the courts have deemed the doctors’ actions as negligent. 
This would appear to contradict the statement in McKay v Essex31 
where they said that such a case would only succeed on the ‘basis of a 
right not to be born deformed or disabled’32 The recent judgements 
promote and encourage the fact that PND, and possibly PGD in the 
future, are requirements of a pregnancy. Doctors will be inclined to do 
all they can to avoid expensive lawsuits - a danger which the Law 
Commission 33 warned of in 1974 - and it also encourages the public to 
see the birth of a disabled child as an act of negligence not one of 
natural misfortune.
So the law acknowledges that there is such a thing as an 
‘intolerable’ life and has ruled on withdrawing or withholding treatment 
accordingly. In the ‘wrongful birth’ cases, they have demonstrated their 
support for PND, and by extension PGD, by awarding damages for 
children born with a disability after screening tests were not offered or 
negligendy performed. By so doing, they further the cause of PND and 
force doctors to include these tests routinely if they wish to avoid cosdy 
lawsuits. In the recent case of Parkinson v St James & Seacroft 
University Hospital NHS trust34 the courts, by awarding costs for the 
upbringing of a child with disabilities after a failed sterilisation which 
had not happened in the case of McFarlane v Lords35 where a normal 
child was born after failed sterilisation, they deemed this a 
compensatable fact.
Through both of these decisions, encouraging screening and 
abortion of disabled foetuses through PND by deeming doctors 
negligent for not offering suitable tests, and by seeing the birth of a 
disabled child as an extra cost to be compensated for, the law is sending 
a strong message to medicine and the public that the birth of a disabled
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child is something to be avoided and if not, compensated for, regarding 
natural misfortune as negligence.
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1.4 Health Measurements
As discussed in 1.2.1, what is considered to be ‘health’ 
involves a combination of models and value judgements. It follows that 
it lacks uniformity and consistency and is therefore not a quantifiable 
concept. But that has not prevented many attempts to do so. It is easy 
to understand these attempts, for there are a multitude of clinical and 
economic reasons for wanting to measure health: to gauge the health of 
a population so that health policies can be formulated; to assess the 
success or failure of a given treatment; to optimise use of resources, 
among others.
The cost implications are one of the major driving forces 
behind health measurement. In Western countries especially, the cost of 
health care is expanding gready as the population ages and treatment 
becomes ever more sophisticated and employs ever more expensive 
drugs and equipment. If we had a quantifiable scale we could have a 
means by which to ensure that health care use and distribution are 
maximised to provide the most benefit to the greatest number of 
people.
There is also a realisation that not only can countries not 
afford to provide all health care to all its citizens, but that all medical 
treatment for everyone may not be appropriate. In the face of growing 
public expectations of medicine, policy makers, health economists and 
doctors need to come up with justifiable reasons for not providing 
everything for everyone and data to support these decisions. It has been 
said however ‘about the only point which commands almost universal 
agreement is that there are several different ways of measuring health 
states.’36
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Health measurement is a wide ranging term covering many 
forms of scales, indicators and indices. They vary on who does the 
measuring, whether by professionals or self-report, what population is 
being measured, whether healthy or with a specific disease, and what is 
being measured. They can be looking at one specific aspect of health or 
disease or trying to assess the broader picture of overall health and well­
being.
The important factors in judging a measurement scale are its 
validity, reliability, and ease of use.
Validity asks:
1. Is it covering all aspects of the attribute that you want to 
measure?
2. Does it really measure that attribute?
3. Can the attribute actually be measured accurately?
Reliability concerns its repeatability:
1. Between different scales.
2. Between different test subjects.
3. Its sensitivity to change.
The ease of use asks whether it is of an acceptable length, 
such that people will happily complete it, that it can be administered 
easily and that it is easily understood by the respondent and the 
investigator.
Types of measurement vary from simple biochemical tests, 
survival rates after treatment, through functional assessments, specific 
disease outcome tests, to general health scales and utility ratings which 
combine all data into one figure.
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Initially assessments of health were crude indicators of 
morbidity and mortality which can be useful but give an incomplete 
picture and concentrate on the negative aspects of health without 
regard to well-being.
Biophysical markers such as blood counts can be used to 
assess health, but these concentrate on the narrow model of health, 
looking for normal functioning or absence of disease.
Functional tests have been widely used to assess levels or type 
of care needed, progress of a disease, progress of rehabilitation, ability 
to drive, award of benefits and so on. These concentrate on the ability 
or otherwise to perform certain functions considered to be necessary 
for normal life.
They can range from routine eye tests to assess sight, an 
important requirement for driving, assessment of suitability for work, 
or eligibility for state benefit, to measurement to gauge improvement 
through rehabilitation after injury or illness.
There are limitations to these tests, however, as the site of 
testing may be entirely different from the home environment. Aids that 
are available in hospital may not be available where the person lives and 
has to perform these functions daily. There may also be greater 
motivation and support within a hospital environment to try and do 
things which may be lacking at home. Ann Bowling says that they 
‘narrowly focus on a range of mobility, domestic and self-care tests, 
often....ignoring emotional and social needs which may be equally or 
more important/37
So functional tests may give an idea of the capabilities of 
someone but give little information about the additional components of 
overall ‘health’.
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Specific disease scales can be useful when looking at a 
defined population. Clinical guidelines are an example of such a scale, 
which attempt to standardise treatments and their allocation across the 
country, thus ensuring fair distribution of health care.
The Royal College of Paediatrics guidelines on withholding 
and withdrawing treatment from neonates deal with instances which are 
considered examples of what constitutes an ‘intolerable’ life - if any 
disorder would cause an infant to be in one of these positions, and thus 
eligible for treatment to be stopped or withdrawn, then it might be 
appropriate to prevent the birth of that child using PGD or PND.
This is acceptable if the child is
1. Brain dead
2. In a permanent vegetative state
3. In a ‘no-chance’ situation, where the disease is so severe that life 
sustaining treatment simply delays death without alleviation of 
suffering
4. ‘no-purpose’ situation, where although patient may survive 
treatment, the degree of mental or physical impairment will be so 
great as to be unreasonable to expect them to bear it
5. unbearable situation, where in the face of progressive and 
irreversible illness, further treatment is more than can be borne. 
This is irrespective of medical opinion on its potential benefit.
Although these are defined guidelines, they are still open to 
discussion and medical opinion. Few would argue with being brain 
dead, there has been argument about PVS as seen in the various 
medical opinions offered in Tony Bland’s case, but the other categories 
are assessments based on medical opinion and will vary from case to
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case. As the patient cannot be consulted in the case of a neonate, it will 
be the decision of the doctors in consultation with the parents.
If there is dissent or uncertainty, the agreed way forward is to 
act in the child’s best interests, again an assessment, not an objective 
stand. Extreme cases can be found which illustrate the problems of 
conflicting viewpoints. In the States, an anencephalic child, Baby K38 
was kept alive for many years, despite the fact that hospital physicians 
regarded the treatment as inappropriate, at the insistence of the mother 
- certainly not in the child’s best interests and at huge cost to the state. 
On the opposite view, a couple, the Stintsons39, were told before birth 
that their son was brain damaged, and he was born prematurely at 24 
weeks. They requested no aggressive treatment but were overruled by 
medical staff and the baby underwent months of treatment until he 
died aged 6 months. They felt that they and their baby went through a 
pointless and harrowing experience because in their case medical 
opinion took precedence.
So although guidelines are useful, indeed necessary, they can 
only be guidelines and are susceptible to pressure from involved parties. 
But if strictly adhered to with regard to potential children, possibly a 
less emotive issue than an existing neonate, it might be possible to 
adjudge that any disorder which would cause a child to be in any of 
these categories for non-treatment would be a suitable candidate for 
PGD or PND. This would appear to be a good scientific measure but 
yet again it involves wide variation in manifestations of disorders, 
parental experience and attitudes and clinical experience.
As these scales relied on a negative view of health, which 
ruled out the majority of the population who were not in ill-health, 
attempts were made to define scales which could encompass all aspects
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of health and well-being - physical, mental and social, negative and 
positive. Some health measurements try to measure all these aspects 
and then collate the information into one figure using sophisticated 
mathematical models which may also assign different weights’ to items.
General health scales were developed initially, which tried to 
include all these aspects.
The Sickness Impact Profile was developed in the USA for 
use as an ‘outcome measure for health-care evaluation.’40 In it, ‘sickness 
is measured in relation to its impact on behaviour.’41 It concentrates on 
behavioural responses to illness, without measuring the feelings of 
patients as the authors felt that they were ‘less subject to bias than 
feelings.’42 It has been widely tested for reliability and validity and is 
thus considered a good form of measurement, but it is lengthy and can 
only be used with ‘people who are regarded or who regard themselves 
as ill.’43
In the UK the Nottingham Health profile has been 
developed and is based on lay perceptions of health. It ‘relates to how 
people feel when they are experiencing various states of ill-health.’44 It 
has been tested for reliability and validity and is short and easy to 
administer, but it doesn’t cover all aspects of functioning, or mental 
health. It also concentrates on negative aspects of health and so cannot 
be considered to be a measurement of overall health or well-being.
The McMaster Health Index Questionnaire was developed ‘as 
a measure of physical, social and emotional functioning.’45 It focuses on 
present ability, is simple to administer and is ‘positive in its 
orientation.’46 Its only drawback is that is has not been adequately 
assessed for reliability and validity and is of dubious value for older 
populations.
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A refinement of functional testing has been produced by the 
WHO this year, called the ‘International classification of functioning, 
disability and health’47 or ICIDH-2 and has over 100 pages of test 
categories. It is split into 2 main sections - measuring functioning and 
disability of body functions and structures and ‘contextual’48 factors in 
activities and participation. It is said to be a ‘classification of people’s 
health characteristics within the context of their individual life 
situations and environmental impacts.’49
It tries to cover aspects of health - social, physical and mental 
health but does not touch socio-economic factors. The intention is to 
provide a ‘scientific basis for understanding and studying health 
states.’50 However they also ask users to not ‘assume homogeneity 
among individuals classed similarly’51 which would be a requirement of 
a scientific class.
Although the WHO stress that the categories should be 
expressed ‘in a neutral way to avoid deprecation, stigmatisation and 
inappropriate connotations’52, it must be used to classify individuals - 
that is its aim - and will thus provide data for cut-off points for state 
benefit and possibly medical treatment.
It is also a very lengthy, if comprehensive, test and could 
therefore be difficult to administer. It may be hard to persuade 
someone to go through such an invasion of privacy if they see no 
benefit afterwards in their lives other than their data being used to 
further health research.
In all of these tests, which all try to measure general health, 
there are advantages and drawbacks. As demonstrated by ICIDH-2 any 
attempt to cover all aspects of health and well-being becomes very large 
and unwieldy and thus difficult to administer. In consequence shorter,
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more comprehensive tests are more widely used but this can lead to an 
unbalanced view or measure of ‘health’.
One of the main tests finding favour with policy makers and 
economists at present, is the Quality of Adjusted Life scale or the 
QALY. This is a utility scale which aims to quantify ‘quality’ of life as 
part of a measurement of health care benefit. The term was first used in 
1977 in a paper by Weinstein and Stason53 where they described it as a 
ratio of health care cost against effectiveness of health care in terms of 
life expectancy and quality.
The scale has been further developed and is now almost 
universally used. Now 1 QALY is equal to one year of current life in 
perfect health - thus one can describe medical treatment with respect to 
the number of QALYs it will produce. The concept of the QALY is 
now described as ‘health, conceptualised as years of life weighted by the 
health-related quality of life experienced in these years.’54
The calculation of the QALYs from a given treatment is 
obtained by multiplying the number of years life would be prolonged by 
the treatment by the improvement in quality of life that it would 
produce. The additional years lived are predicted from assessment of 
previous outcomes and the quality of life is based on ratings of various 
health states on a numerical scale which have been obtained from the 
general public, people in those states of health and health professionals.
These assessments of quality of life in various health states 
will be subject to the assessor’s concept of quality of life. As seen 
previously, this will vary according to their past experience, whether 
personal or clinical and be influenced by the attitudes of society. It has 
been argued that, as with ‘health’ discussed earlier, there is ‘no clear and 
universally accepted concept of quality of life.’55
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Thus, if the numerical values that are required to calculate a 
QALY are based on an immeasurable concept, it follows that the 
QALY itself is not a true measurement, or to put it another way ‘if the 
data put into the equation are invalid, so will the result be.’56
One of the other problems with the QALY is that if you start 
with a poor health rating, then any additional treatment will combine 
with this in the calculation to give a poor QALY outcome. John 
Harris57 refers to this as ‘double jeopardy/ This means that if all 
disabled states are rated as being poor states of health then no 
additional treatment will give a good QALY outcome, essential to 
justify your treatment in economic terms. But, as described earlier (1.2), 
health status in not solely linked to physical health. Thus to rate 
someone in a wheelchair as having a poor state of health just because 
they cannot walk is to give a negative and inaccurate assessment of their 
overall ‘health’.
Similarly for older patients, their QALY outcome will always 
be lower than that of younger patients because the young will always 
have more years to live. If someone has a hip replacement however, 
this will not necessarily lead to more years of life but will certainly lead 
to greater mobility and freedom from pain, both enhancing the 
person’s life. This increase in health and well-being would surely be 
considered a good health care outcome but not necessarily give a good 
QALY outcome. The same problem arises with QALY rating of 
palliative care, which although not increasing the number of years can 
give relief from distress and may lead to a state of well-being as 
described earlier (p8).
John Harris and others have also argued that the use of the 
QALY may lead to discrimination. ‘Many diseases are fairly specific to
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economic classes, or regions of the country or races’58 and problems 
will arise if ‘such groups are vulnerable to conditions that are not 
QALY efficient.’59
Alan Williams, who has done much of the work developing 
the QALY in the UK, has said that cit is the responsibility of everyone 
to discriminate wherever necessary to ensure that our limited resources 
go where they will do the most good.’60 But as Michael Lockwood has 
argued ‘what justice actually requires is that we do not discriminate 
between people on the basis of unjust criteria’61 and he cites race and 
sex as 2 examples. It is not evident that the QALY does discriminate 
fairly or justly.
As many QALY outcomes have not been as wished or are 
‘counter-intuitive’62, mathematical models have been developed to 
‘weight’ various factors to give the outcomes desired. However, as 
discussed earlier, if the basic data is flawed no amount of mathematical 
fixing will solve the problem. ‘The concept is fundamentally flawed 
because one cannot rate the quality of life of a health state on a 
numerical scale.’63
In addition, the QALY models, according to Ann Bowling, 
‘suffer from severe limitations’64 in that they have not been adequately 
tested for validity and reliability.
Evaluation of health procedure and outcomes is certainly a 
necessity if they are to improve and the most appropriate form of 
treatment given. Biochemical tests do give a scientific, though limited, 
view of the body’s state. Functional tests may not give an accurate 
evaluation of function, depending on where and how they are carried 
out. Both of these measure only narrow parameters, not the concept of 
overall health that was discussed earlier. This concept involves the
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coming together of many different factors with empowerment and as 
these factors all involve value judgements, it is immeasurable.
As a set or combination of judgements, the position of the 
assessor is also influential. The subjective assessment of the patient 
may allow more successful interpretations of the impact that disease 
and treatment have on his or her quality of life, whereas objective 
indicators may merely be projections of professional mores.’65
Health measurement will undoubtedly continue and expand 
as resources are limited and numbers of health economists grow. But it 
has been argued by many that the basis of health policy decision should 
not be an attempt to quantify in one figure immeasurable concepts, but 
rather the principle of equality. Thus everyone should have access to 
basic medical and nursing care whatever their health status. On a 
macroallocation of funds or formulation of health policies the basis 
should be to select beneficial treatments which are medically accepted 
as good practice and which have been proven in their results. This 
would create a fairer distribution of limited health resources than 
evaluation of the QALY outcome.
Health measurements can be general indicators of negatively 
defined health but categorisation of a state of well-being, an essential 
component of overall ‘health’, is not possible. Perhaps the most useful 
health measurement for assessment of candidate disorders for PGD are 
the guidelines for withholding or withdrawing treatment in neonates. 
Even these are based on subjective evaluation as described earlier, but 
given that decisions have to be made, and so long as decision makers 
are aware of the qualitative nature of the assessment, they provide a 
framework. So that, if a disorder would cause a child to be considered
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under these guidelines, then that disorder would be a suitable candidate 
for PGD or PND.
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1.5 Conclusions
In considering what constitutes an ‘intolerable’ life, a 
prerequisite for PGD and PND, one is met with serious difficulties. 
Health (1.2) is such a complex concept involving many internal and 
extraneous factors that assessing it in anyone’s life is difficult, if not 
impossible, and it follows that doing so in predicting a future life will be 
even more so. On the other hand it may be easier, and less emotive, to 
give an account of the future health of an embryo or foetus, than 
making decisions on an existing child.
The courts (1.3) have shown that they are willing to make 
treatment decisions based on the ‘quality’ of life of the affected party.
In the cases involving PND (no cases concerning PGD having come to 
court yet) they have come out strongly in favour of PND by awarding 
damages for failure to provide tests and failure to detect handicap in 
time to abort the pregnancy. By doing so, the law seems to view failure 
to weed out handicap as compensateable, commensurate with them 
saying that these lives would be intolerable if allowed to go to term. 
There are discrepancies in their decisions, however. In McLelland v 
Greater Glasgow Health Board66 they awarded damages for failure to 
detect Down’s syndrome and for the subsequent birth and upkeep of 
the child. On the other hand, in reB67, a child with Down’s syndrome 
who required surgery, they decided that treatment must go ahead 
because the child’s life was tolerable and not predictable.
In terms of health measurement (1.4), there are many 
different ways of assessing health or various aspects of it. I have argued 
that the concept of overall health is an immeasurable one, based as it is 
on a combination of value judgements. Even the functional tests are 
flawed in that they are dependent on where and how the tests are
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performed. Thus these scales give some indication but no definitive 
assessment of what constitutes an intolerable life. The Royal College of 
Paediatrics clinical guidelines on treatment for neonates may be of 
greatest practical use, but these call for prediction of future outcome 
when related to PGD and PND.
In the case of PGD and PND the decision of what is 
regarded as acceptable form of life will be taken mainly by the 
prospective parents. However one has to consider whether they are 
considering what is tolerable for the prospective child or what is 
tolerable to themselves?
From a medical viewpoint, the pressure to perform PND 
from the legal decisions is immense. There is also pressure on the 
public through health promotion programmes which encourage people 
to take responsibility for their own health. These programmes promote 
participation in screening tests as responsible actions for those 
concerned with their health and PND and PGD are categorised as such 
tests.
If society, medicine and the law are all encouraging 
'treatment’ of handicap by screening and aborting through PND or 
non-replacement of embryos using PGD then there will be additional 
pressure on parents to act responsibly, take the tests and act on the 
results.
In PGD the disorders for which there are tests are not 
necessarily those which create the most intolerable lives, but rather 
those in which there has been the greatest research carried out, or 
which are sex-linked. These are often the most common genetic 
disorders in the western world, such as Duchenne Muscular Dystrophy, 
which was in fact the first candidate for PGD.
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This consideration of what constitutes an intolerable life 
leaves a very limited number of disorders which would inevitably lead 
to such a life - possibly where there is unmanageable pain, limited 
ability to treat medically or complete lack of intellectual acuity.
If any of these 3 elements would be present in a sufferer from 
a given disorder then it could be argued that these are basic welfare 
interests (1.2.3) which would be harmed, thus not allowing a ‘decent’ 
life, or perhaps conferring an ‘intolerable’ one. Based on the 
justification of PGD and PND as prevention of intolerable lives, only 
those disorders whose disease process would harm these basic interests 
would be considered suitable candidates for PGD and PND.
So after considering what constitutes an intolerable life and 
its use as justification for PGD and PND, I will now consider whether 
the use of these techniques, especially PGD, could be justified for sex 
selection and the screening of genetic traits.
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Chapter 2
Medical screening and PGD as a screening tool
2.1 Medical Screening
Medical screening has been described by Stone & Stewart as 
‘a preventative activity which seeks to identify an unsuspected disease 
or pre-disease condition for which an effective intervention is 
available’68
Wilson and Junger69 drew up criteria for screening 
programmes in 1968 for the WHO. They noted 10 points, of which the 
following are pertinent to antenatal screening:
1. The condition sought should be an important health problem.
2. There should be an accepted treatment for patients with 
recognised disease.
3. Facilities for diagnosis and treatment should be available.
4. There should be a recognisable latent or early symptomatic stage.
5. The natural history of the condition, including development 
from latent to declared disease, should be adequately understood.
6. The cost of case finding (including diagnosis and treatment of 
patients diagnosed) should be economically balanced in relation 
to possible expenditure on medical care as a whole.
It has also been argued that there are also ethical criteria for 
screening programmes: that
‘they satisfy the criteria for any sort of medical intervention’;
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there is a ‘responsibility for the [medical] professional to 
justify the intervention which may not have been requested’;
‘some screening procedures carry health risks, and all of them 
are likely to be accompanied by discomfort, anxiety and inconvenience’;
‘any screening programme carries with it the risk of the false 
positive or the false negative’.70
Thus it is said that ‘screening requires as much ethical 
justification as other medical interventions.’71
In all the descriptions and discussions regarding screening, 
great emphasis is placed on the need for an effective treatment of the 
disease for which you are screening. In the case of prenatal diagnosis 
(PND) the only treatment that is available in the majority of cases is 
termination of any affected pregnancy. In Preimplantation Diagnosis 
(PGD) the treatment is non-replacement of affected embryos. PGD 
specifically deals with genetic disorders, of which it has been said ‘the 
rapid molecular advances... have resulted in techniques that permit 
presymptomatic diagnosis before any rational approach to treatment 
has been developed.’72
Mason and McCall Smith have stated that W e also call into 
question the ethical propriety of making available a plethora of tests for
conditions for which no treatment or cure is available In these
circumstances, the availability of such tests can only be justified to 
facilitate an abortion decision - otherwise offering them can be seen as 
little more than a waste of resources.’73
One of the justifications of PND and PGD is to provide 
more choice. By providing as much information about a given 
pregnancy, or of the tests that are available, it is argued that you 
increase the patient’s choice regarding their future offspring. But, as
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considered by Mason and McCall Smith above, this increase of choice 
appears only to provide the option of terminating the pregnancy.
Another justification of screening tests in general is that of 
reducing suffering, or with PND and PGD preventing intolerable life as 
considered in Chapter 1.
Screening has also been promoted in terms of cost-benefit. 
An article in The Independent’ of August, 2001 states that 'since the 
costs of caring for Down’s syndrome babies often fall on the state the 
costs of better screening strategies can be justified in economic as well 
as humanitarian terms.’74 This way of judging benefit from screening 
places no, or indeed a negative, value on the affected child itself if it 
were to be born.
Screening programmes in general have been well received by 
the general population. They have been promoted as a way of taking 
responsibility for one’s own health and a form of disease prevention.
There have been examples of genetic screening programmes, 
however, which have caused major problems. In America in the 70’s, 
the programme of screening for sickle cell carriers caused problems 
among the black population screened. David Weatherall has said 'All 
that program achieved was public anxiety, stigmatization, job and 
health insurance discrimination and a variety of other undesirable 
effects.’75
The Human Genetics Commission (HGC) in 2000 stated, 
with regard to genetic testing in pregnancy, that protocols should be in 
place so that:
'- those who may benefit [from genetic testing] are offered 
the opportunity [to have it]
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- no presumption that PND would be unacceptable to the
patient
- no presumption by doctor that each woman should accept 
all or any test offered
- informed decision not to have test must be accepted’76
It is felt by some that it is very difficult for women to refuse 
antenatal testing. Angus Clarke has put it as 'perhaps every woman 
should attend an assertiveness training course before becoming 
pregnant’77 The need for free choice in PND is highlighted by a group 
called Antenatal Results and Choices, which offers support to people 
going through the testing process. In October, 2001 they said 'There’s a 
real need for a lot more input before, during and after the process so 
that women really understand not just what the tests are for, but what 
the information they’ve given really means.’78
The informed use of screening is dependent on patients’ 
ability to calculate their risk, digest all the information they are given, 
and come to an informed decision. This may not be achievable if 
information is not given in a way that they can understand, or if time is 
not available for discussion. Julia Black argues that in a hospital 
situation, issues are informed by the medical profession, thus 'the 
individual’s participation is restricted ...to the ability to say yes or no to 
what is offered, not to shape the choice.’79 This reiterates the HGC 
view that as much emphasis should be put on information given before 
testing as to whether it is wanted at all.
All screening always has a certain number of false positives 
and false negatives, and this has to be considered along with all the 
other information. Some tests will only give the probability of an 
affected pregnancy - such as in the tests for Down’s syndrome. Nuchal
48
fold scanning and the triple test will only give a figure of e.g. a 1:100 
chance of the foetus being affected. This can only be definitively 
confirmed by amniocentesis, which is invasive and carries a risk of 
losing the foetus, whether affected or not. The patient has to be 
enabled to assess all these factors and come to an informed choice.
This, however, can only be achieved through a non-directive 
approach to counselling - something which studies have found not to 
always be the case. Michie et al carried out a study in 1997 and 
concluded ' genetic counselling was not characterised - by counsellors, 
counselees or a standardised rating scale - as uniformly non-directive.’ 80 
Others have argued that it not possible to achieve this, and Shiloh & 
Saxe suggested that it might not be useful. They found that 'the more 
neutral the counsellor was perceived to be, the higher the counselee 
perceived his or her own risk to be’81 Lippman-Hand & Fraser also 
found that 'counselees interpreted non-directiveness not as neutral but 
as tacit approval of their stated course of action.’82
Another screening programme that has been considered a 
success is that of neonate testing for phenylketonuraia (PKU). But as 
the US President’s commission83 stated in 1983, they had problems in 
setting the threshold for a positive outcome. At the time of the test, 
when the baby is 3 days old, many hadn’t eaten enough protein to raise 
their levels of the product that the test is based on. This led to a great 
number of undetected cases, so the threshold value was lowered. This 
in turn led to a rise in the number of false positives, in fact it was found 
that more than 90% of babies with initial positive results were found on 
further testing not to have PKU.
This setting of a threshold is a problem of all screening tests. 
In PND for Down’s syndrome for example, the initial tests only give a
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probability. The definitive test is amniocentesis but this is too risky and 
expensive to offer to all pregnant women so other tests are used to 
indicate those most at risk.
If a test is available, especially through public funding such as 
in the NHS, this implies that it is in the public interest, encouraging 
good health in the population. This also reinforces the abortion of non­
perfect foetuses as part of policy. As Ruth Chadwick says cif 
government takes an interest in the genetic health of the population, 
there may be pressure on individuals to make certain sorts of 
reproductive decisions’84 Angus Clarke says rather pessimistically that 
‘the common public image of geneticists [is] as a type of orwellian 
reproductive police force’ 85 Thus social and medical pressure may 
combine to affect the decision of patients.
As Barbara Katz Rothman has said ‘For all the “non­
directionality” a given counsellor may strive to achieve, the technology 
changes cultural meanings’86
There is an underlying suspicion that one of the motivating 
factors in this service may be the fear of litigation. As stated earlier in 
1.2.2, the courts have been behind patient’s claims against the medical 
profession when they have a disabled child. Thus any clinician will have 
to be able to prove that they offered all available tests and provided all 
available information, otherwise they may find themselves facing 
charges of negligence.
The question of evaluation is also raised within screening 
programmes - how do we evaluate genetic testing success? Ruth 
Chadwick has stated it simply as ‘success consists in individuals making 
choices in the light of relevant genetic information.’87 It is difficult to 
assess good dissemination of information but relatively easy to measure
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the number of abortions carried out as a result of that information.
This form of evaluation would change the emphasis of the service 
toward that of aborting any affected pregnancy.
Angus Clarke has said about evaluation "When carrier 
screening programmes are judged by the uptake rate achieved and by 
the money “saved” by terminating pregnancies, we will know that cost- 
benefit-based, “public health genetics” (eugenics) has arrived.’88
I will discuss eugenics in Chapter 4, but, as we have already 
considered, the value of PND and PGD has already been vouched in 
terms of saving costs to society of care of affected individuals.
Angus Clarke has stated that ‘there are several ways in which 
genetic counselling can operate to reduce the suffering caused by 
genetic disorders.’89 He gives 6 examples:
1. Achieving ‘a precise diagnosis of the cause of a child’s handicap 
can itself be therapeutic for the family’
2. The screening for complications of genetic disease may assist in 
the management of the affected individuals
3. Providing practical and social support for the affected individuals 
and their families
4. It may help to reduce ‘handicap’ by minimising ‘the stigma 
associated with disability and handicap, hoping to develop the 
self-esteem of affected individuals’
5. Helping to develop specific therapies and their application.
6. Providing information about future reproductive risks and 
options will benefit couples at risk to make an informed choice.
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None of these options would provide a ‘cure’ per se - they 
just aim to adjust the position of the parents toward and the social 
attitude to their children.
PGD has been suggested to be a better form of treatment 
than PND. This fact was stated in the first report of successful PGD in 
19909° _ patients viewed it as preferable to PND and termination.
I will discuss the arguments surrounding the status of 
embryos and foetuses in chapter 5. Here I will consider this preference 
in terms of whether it is a less traumatic treatment. Both procedures 
have the same intended outcome for the pregnancy, but the prospective 
parent may be able to relate more to a 16 week foetus as a potential 
child rather than an embryo in a laboratory dish. Many reports have 
also said that the medical profession find terminations traumatic, so 
that non-replacement of embryos may seem preferable to them too.
IVF, an integral part of PGD, is not a risk free procedure 
however, and many people find it extremely stressful. It is also not 
particularly successful, with national averages of around 15-20% live 
births per treatment cycle. Thus PGD should not be considered to be 
an easy alternative to PND.
In terms of the criteria listed on page 1, both PND and PGD 
offer only termination or prevention of an affected pregnancy as 
‘effective intervention.’ The argument that these tests offer greater 
choice has been contested by many. PND has now become a routine 
part of antenatal care and there is often little time for explanation of the 
tests or consideration of what the outcome may be or entail.
Patients coming for PGD will generally have been through 
the genetic counselling service because of having an affected child or
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relative. They will then have had more time to discuss the procedures 
and options available to them.
2.2 PGD as a screening tool
The existence of PGD as a screening tool has led to many 
fears that its use will be expanded as it becomes more accepted by 
patients and society. Thus it could be used not only to detect serious 
genetic disorders that cause harming of welfare interests as discussed in 
Chapter 1 but also for behavioural traits, minor disorders or selecting 
the sex of the child.
As PGD is based on detection of the presence or absence of 
a gene, anything with a genetic component could feasibly become a 
factor to be screened for. The huge amount of media coverage of the 
Human genome Project means that hardly a week goes by without a 
‘gene for’ being announced. As scientists unravel the genome, which 
has now been completely mapped, and discover what function each 
component part plays in human life, then it is argued that we will have a 
blueprint for what makes each of us individuals.
Many of the genes now being investigated are not disease 
specific but rather purport to control behaviour or personality traits. 
There has been news of a gene for homosexuality, and for aggression, 
and work is being carried out to see if there is a genetic component to 
intelligence. Once scientists state that they have found a cgene for’ then 
a test for that will follow closely and thus the ability to use PGD to 
screen for its presence or absence becomes a possibility.
PGD could then become a tool for selection of the ‘best’ 
child rather than screening for potentially harming genetic disorders.
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In the light of the justification for the use of PGD that I 
proposed in Chapter 1 ,1 will consider whether these uses of PGD 
could be acceptable.
2.2.1 Sex Selection
One of the potential uses of PGD is for sex selection such 
that prospective parents could have the child of the sex they want.
As mentioned in the introduction and the nature of PGD 
(pi) some of the disorders that are presendy screened for are X-linked. 
This means that females can be carriers of the gene but only males will 
manifest the disorder itself. Duchenne Muscular Dystrophy is one such 
disease and the first use of PGD was to help families known to carry 
the gene for Duchenne Muscular Dystrophy. They used sex selection of 
embryos to prevent the birth of affected children as a test for the gene 
was not yet available. Thus all embryos were sexed and only female 
ones replaced with all male embryos discarded whether affected or not.
The primary function of these tests was not however to 
enable people to have children of a specific sex but to prevent the birth 
of children with Duchenne Muscular Dystrophy.
At least one couple in the UK have requested PGD to enable 
them to have a female child after they had lost their only daughter in an 
accident. Their request was turned down by the HFEA who decided 
after public consultation that this use of PGD should only be to 
prevent sex-linked disorders and not for social reasons.
If the stated aim of PGD and PND is to enable people to 
have healthy children then can one argue that selecting the sex of the 
child will be beneficial to their health?
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If we consider the concept of overall health from the 
previous chapter, then none of the welfare interests could be 
considered harmed by being born of a given sex except those relevant 
to social health or one’s parents carried a sex-linked disorder. Thus the 
ability to earn a living, live free of interference or coercion, absence of 
groundless anxieties and capacity to engage normally in social 
intercourse (p9) could be affected. This would only occur because of 
societal discrimination not because of any natural misfortune. Although 
it has been said that Trom the future child’s point of view, it will make 
little difference, other things being equal, whether her quality of life is 
diminished by social prejudice or by natural endowment.’91
So there could be harming of an individual’s interests by 
being born of a given sex into a discriminatory society. Most western 
societies however now have anti-discrimination legislation and regard it 
as a form of justice that one should not be prejudiced just for being of a 
given sex. In the UK at least one would find it hard to obtain an 
abortion solely on the grounds of foetal gender, so selection at the 
embryonic stage should be based on the same anti-discriminatory 
principles.
The difference between natural impairment and social 
prejudice is that society can act to change prejudice. This is the basis of 
anti-discriminatory legislation. Even if one does not feel that it succeeds 
in many ways, the majority would still support the idea that prejudice is 
wrong. As Berkowitz stated ‘Preconceptive sex selection represents 
sexism in its purest most blatant form as prior to conception, before 
any psychological or physical manifestations appear, before parents can 
possibly know anything about their child, a child’s worth is based in 
large part on its sex’92
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Thus assumptions of the best interests of the child are based 
solely on one aspect of its life, its gender. These assumptions find their 
support in stereotypical social roles and sexist preconceptions which 
legislation has tried to alter in western society.
To justify the use of PGD on the basis of prejudice would 
not be considered acceptable in a fair and equal society.
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2.2.2 Non-disease genetic traits
Other traits which may be found to have a genetic 
component may be considered possible candidates for PGD. These 
range from those that most would consider trivial such as eye or hair 
colour through to intelligence and behavioural traits.
Firstly the idea of screening for eye or hair colour. It could be 
argued that society favours certain characteristics more than others - 
being blond and blue eyed may be an advantage in some societies, as 
was the case in Nazi Germany. Even without the extreme example of 
the notion of Aryan supremacy this favouring of certain characteristics 
is wholly based on societal prejudices. Certainly people do already try to 
select these characteristics in their children by selecting their partners 
for characteristics that they value.
To select an embryo on the basis of its looks has no basis in 
harming of welfare interests as its justification, rather it once again 
values the child for one specific aspect of its appearance and bases that 
value on prejudices in society.
It has been suggested that behavioural traits such as 
aggression may have a genetic component. Again this leads to 
suggestions that screening for this using PGD would lead to a better 
society and would be in the interests of the child. The basis for this is 
that aggressive behaviour if not controlled leads to violence in society 
and that anyone born with such a genetic tendency would not have a 
good life and lack opportunities in their life. This presupposes however 
that behaviour has its main roots in genes and cannot be influenced by 
upbringing or societal environment.
The same argument for increased opportunities in life is also 
used to support selection for intelligence if such a gene is found to
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exist. This once again depends on accepting the fact that environmental 
factors play no part in how an individual turns out. No matter what the 
basic intelligence of a child what is important is the support and help 
they receive when young to enable them to learn about their 
surroundings. This is then continued through school where once again 
if there is poor support and encouragement, whether from their 
teachers or at home, the ability to fully utilise what intelligence they 
have will be hampered.
It was demonstrated in the use of IQ tests in the US among 
draftees during WW1 that these tests do not necessarily measure what 
they claim to. In this instance a good result was dependent on 
knowledge of the language and customs of America, something a lot of 
emigrants and poorly educated people did not have.
Perhaps it could be argued that if a genetic factor were 
isolated then this would provide a more accurate assessment of 
intelligence. But if that were the case then education for all would be a 
poindess concept as there would be no point in wasting valuable 
resources and time on educating those without the gene who 
supposedly could not derive any benefit.
So to say that we should only allow the birth of intelligent 
people would be wholly dependent on ensuring their continued support 
and development throughout life otherwise the potential would be 
wasted.
Another ‘gene for’ that has been suggested is that for 
homosexuality. In this instance even the investigation for such a gene 
carries with it some hint of prejudice. It has been suggested that given 
the prejudice and discrimination that being homosexual means in 
society it would be in the best interests of the future child to screen for
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and select against the gene. Again this is reacting to a societal problem 
wrongly by avoiding the issue of stereotypical prejudice by eradicating 
the people themselves.
It has been argued that basic welfare interests are harmed 
because of prejudice but as in the case of gender selection, this should 
be an impetus to change irrational prejudice in society not to use 
genetics to support them.
In addition to the above traits, Julian Savulescu93 has argued 
that minor diseases such as asthma should be screened out if a gene is 
discovered. Asthma can certainly be a dangerous disease but one which 
can be adequately controlled with good treatment. When it is controlled 
it is not an impediment to living a productive and fulfilling life, thus 
would not be considered to harm welfare interests to an extent that life 
with asthma would be intolerable.
2.2.3 Conclusions
In raising the prospect of using PGD to screen for the above 
traits one begins to be faced with the idea of creating a perfect child. 
Most prospective parents will try and create the best possible 
environment for their child and indeed many select partners on the 
basis of having characteristics they would like to pass on to their 
children.
But children are not consumer objects to be selected from a 
range on the shelf. Genes may confer predispositions toward certain 
traits, behaviours or diseases but the environment in which we live and 
grow needs to interact with them for the final outcome. Thus 
upbringing, education and choices made either by the individual 
themselves or their parents in childhood will all combine with genetic 
factors to produce that person’s life.
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To select on the basis of genetic traits what one hopes will be 
the best child could lead to huge disappointment, possibly neglect, if 
the genes don’t live up to expectations. Will we then be faced with 
court cases demanding compensatory damages because the carefully 
selected child fails to display what was expected from them?
As the genome is dissected and more genetic factors 
uncovered, this may lead to the idea of a perfect set of genes. Thus any 
genetic factor that can be screened for becomes an imperfection to be 
selected out. Many genetic factors interact however and these 
interactions are hard to identify. Thus in screening out a perceived 
imperfection we could in fact be deleting a useful gene from the 
population. This selecting of the perceived best genetic information will 
also unnaturally alter the overall gene pool of the population thus 
limiting the genetic diversity.
If as I stated at the beginning of this section (p51) the aim of 
PGD and PND is to produce healthy children, we should bear in mind 
what has been argued previously that health is extremely difficult to 
delineate and indeed achieve. Thus we should be wary of placing too 
much emphasis on specific genetic factors in trying to achieve what is a 
multi-faceted concept.
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2.3 Deafness - a candidate for PGD?
Deafness often has a genetic component especially in those 
born deaf. PGD could thus be used to screen for, and select against, 
these genes. But there are those in the deaf community who would 
argue that deafness is not a disability in a medical sense but a trait of 
those in their community. They have raised the idea of deaf prospective 
parents utilising PGD to select for deafness so that their children could 
also be part of their community.
This argument as to whether deafness is a disability caused by 
medical problems or societal ones has been going on for many years. I 
will discuss the social and medical models of disability more fully in the 
following chapters, but here I will consider how it forms a basis of the 
argument over how to teach deaf children.
The first school for £deaf-mutes’ was founded in Paris in 
1794 and taught pupils from all over France using sign language. Up to 
this point deaf-mutes had been left within their families, 
communicating through rudimentary sign language, receiving no 
education and working within the household. The general consensus 
was that their lack of hearing was indicative of mental retardation and 
that there was no use in even attempting to educate these children as 
they would be incapable of utilising it.
As Laurent Clerc, one of the pupils and later a teacher at the 
Paris school, said £Deaf-mutes have always been thus confused with 
another class of the dumb, the retarded; under Roman law they were 
given a curator. It was not until the twelfth century that they were 
allowed to marry/94
In Spain in the early part of the 16th century a priest did try 
to educate some deaf children. He used sign to teach, formulating a
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sign alphabet and taught writing, languages, science and arts. He did 
also try to teach speech through imitation of tongue movements but the 
main reason for this was not educational. In Spain at this time anyone 
who was mute was not considered a person legally but if they could 
speak, even although they were deaf, they had legal status. Thus the 
priest was employed by a wealthy noble family of the time whose sole 
heir was a deaf-mute. They required him to speak in order to retain 
their tide and keep the wealth within the family.
It wasn’t until the opening of the national institute in France 
nearly 200 years later that teaching through sign was fully developed. 
Deaf children and some adults came from all over France and a French 
sign language was formed from the rudimentary sign language that all 
deaf children naturally use.
This sign language was used to teach writing and reading in 
class and then further education much as any normal school. It had a 
full curriculum with science, history, theology, arts and so on. The 
founder abbe de l’Epee acknowledged that one could teach the deaf to 
speak but also that it required so much time that it squeezed out the 
rest of their education.
The achievements of the school were noted across Europe 
and many countries sent teachers there to learn their techniques in 
order to set up similar schools at home. There were other schools 
however who persisted with teaching speech - in Britain this was the 
predominant form. There was fierce argument between the advocates 
of these 2 methods which still persists.
Laurent Clerc, quoted earlier, was persuaded to go to America 
in 1816 to set up a school. This opened in the following year and it 
spawned many schools across the continent. He taught using sign
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language and some of the pupils became teachers themselves who went 
off to found schools. The school also taught various trades so that 
pupils could have options of how to earn a living on leaving.
Clerc developed the version of American Sign Language 
which is still in use today, adapted from his French sign. He fought 
hard for the rights of the deaf to receive a full education and one of his 
pupils went on to found a college of higher education for the deaf.
He said of his deafness ‘am I truly ill because I do not speak 
your language, or because I am more exposed than you to the danger of 
a runaway horse approaching from behind?’95 He regarded the deaf as a 
linguistic minority rather then a group of people disabled by illness.
He had been exposed when young, as were many of the deaf 
before his time, to various painful and futile attempts to ‘cure’ his 
deafness and was firmly against the medical view of deafness.
After his death in 1869, however, oralism - the teaching of 
the deaf to speak - took over as the main form of deaf education. In the 
US a strong supporter of this was Alexander Graham Bell. Ironically he 
was the inventor of the telephone - one of the main tools of exclusion 
of the deaf from modern society. His wife was deaf but communicated 
solely by speech and lip-reading and abhorred others who were deaf 
and their sign language.
The difference between his and Clerc’s attitude is striking ‘ 
where Clerc found strength in human variety, Bell found weakness and 
danger.’96 Bell said of deaf children W e should try ourselves to forget 
that they are deaf. We should teach them to forget that they are deaf.’97 
Bell was also a supporter of the eugenic movement and thought that
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letting the deaf congregate together would lead to their intermarriage 
and thus to more deaf children.
The aims of the 2 men were also very different. Bell said that 
cthe main object of the education of the deaf is to fit them to live in the 
world of hearing-speaking people.’98 Clerc felt that ‘the overriding 
purpose of education was personal fulfilment.’99
But as Clerc and the founder of the French school stated it is 
very time consuming to teach a deaf child to speak. It is easier, as Clerc 
always pointed out, if the child becomes deaf after birth. In these 
instances they will have knowledge of language, of the hearing world 
and may still have a residual knowledge of the language. In the 
congenitally deaf it is extremely difficult and time consuming to teach 
them speech and this then led to their exclusion from education. In 
Michigan the law stated that ‘The oral system shall be used exclusively 
but if, after nine month’s trial, any child shall be unable to learn by the 
oral method, no further expense shall be incurred in the attempt to 
educate it.’100
It also led to the exclusion of deaf teachers from education as 
they could not be part of this form of teaching. The debate on 
education for the deaf was thus held among hearing people. They 
ignored the achievements of those such as Clerc who was born deaf 
and assumed that the deaf should just be educated into being part of a 
hearing society.
In any deaf child, whether deaf from birth or not, as has been 
stated earlier, the time taken to teach them to speak is so great that their 
general education is necessarily diluted. What is produced is not an 
educated deaf child but rather one that can speak.
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Clerc and his teachers always felt that as sign language was 
the natural language of the deaf it should be used to teach. By receiving 
such a full education through sign, the deaf could become useful and 
productive members of society. Communication with the hearing who 
didn’t know their language could be achieved through hearing 
interpreters or the written word.
If we consider deafness with regard to the welfare interests 
listed in Chapter 1, are any of these harmed? Certainly deafness could 
not be considered as a normal functioning of the body, but then if one 
has never heard as in those born deaf then this is a normal state to 
them.
The interests pertaining to social health can be achieved 
through appropriate education and support. As the pupils from the 
school in Paris and Clerc’s schools in America showed, the deaf can 
become full, productive members of society.
It is through trying to deny the status of sign language, and 
forcing what could be considered to be a linguistic minority like any 
other to see themselves as a medical problem to be ‘cured’, that these 
interests are harmed.
It is sad to think that a century ago Clerc’s pupils, and indeed 
himself, were living happy, fulfilled lives. They received a 
comprehensive education in a safe and caring community and then 
went out into the world and earned their livings. By forcing the hearing 
world’s interpretation of the afflictions of the deaf onto their 
community and teaching, and insisting on making them like £us’, society 
has taken away that ability to lead happy, productive lives.
The argument about education of the deaf continues to this 
day. A letter to The Times of 9th October, 2001 states, with regard to
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the poor use of sign language in education, ‘ It is a national disgrace 
that deaf children of normal intelligence are being allowed to grow up 
functioning as if they were learning impaired.’101
The use of cochlear implants has also raised similar issues. 
Their use in pre-lingually deaf children, before the age of 3-4, has not 
been proven. Results of trials have shown that they ‘do not improve 
their oral communication skills sufficiently to enable them to become 
functioning members of hearing society.’102 Again the arguments would 
sound familiar to Clerc and Bell, ‘when the child receives a cochlear 
implant, he or she is put on a lifelong course of education and 
habilitation, the focus of which is the acquisition of an oral language, 
and ultimately a meaningful engagement with the hearing world.’103
So deafness as a candidate for PGD would appear to be 
another attempt by the hearing majority to stigmatise the deaf 
community. Carl Elliott has described this community as ‘something 
closer to an ethnic or cultural identity, a condition to be proud of rather 
than to overcome.’104 By suggesting that they may wish to select for 
deafness, shows that it feels embattled enough to select for children 
who would be part of their community rather than the outside hearing 
world.
In considering the deaf community as an ethnic or linguistic 
minority, the use of PGD to select against genetic deafness can be 
regarded as societal discrimination. It thus becomes similar to sex 
selection and other non-disease traits where social discrimination rather 
then medical problems harm the welfare interests of the individual.
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Chapter 3
PGD as a means of eradicating disability
3.1 Societal health
The promotion, and indeed existence, of PGD and PND 
appears to advocate an ideal of a disability-free society. Thus screening 
out disability before birth is a way of utilising scientific advances to 
realise this ideal.
An initial response would be that it is an impossible ideal to 
achieve in that there will always be disability. Accidents, whether natural 
or man-made, which cause disability will always happen. As the 
population ages in Britain and life expectancy increases, there will be a 
concomitant increase in age related disability.
The next response, and possibly the more important one, is 
that of whether or not a disability-free society is in fact an ideal, or 
rather a way of ridding us of a problem we’d rather not deal with. If it 
is not an ideal, then what benefits are there of having disability present, 
not in terms of individuals themselves, but to society as a whole?
Certainly people in their communities are rewarded for their 
fund-raising and voluntary work for those with impairments. These 
public awards imply that these activities are viewed as morally good and 
to be encouraged within society. But for whose moral good? By helping 
‘those less those fortunate than ourselves’ we can make ourselves, the 
able-bodied majority, feel virtuous but this does not provide a sufficient 
reason for the presence of disability within society. It also means using 
other human beings for our own ends, rather than respecting them as 
individuals and implies that we regard those with impairments as less 
human than ourselves.
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The presence of disability, it could be argued, is a humbling 
experience for society in that it reminds it of the fragility of the human 
state, but again this seems a less than sufficient reason for having 
disability within society.
Another argument is that diversity makes for a ‘healthier’ 
society. The idea of the health of a society is based on human beings 
being of equal worth and the principle of respect for the individual.
This way of looking at societal health is dependent therefore on the 
promotion of empowerment for the individual, who is then enabled to 
control their own life.
The presence of those with impairments may increase 
tolerance of others. As one mother of a disabled child said, ‘My [able- 
bodied] children have much more compassion than they might have 
had otherwise. They’re very patient and take time to include and explain 
things to Joshua.’105
Societal health also recognises that health has a lot to do with 
social interaction and structure. A society’s health is more than just the 
sum total of its healthy individuals, it also involves the ethos and 
attitudes of that society. This is borne out by society advocating social 
justice for all its members.
Social Justice would demand that society includes those with 
impairments and enables them to be full and active members of society. 
Anti-discrimination laws serve to promote and reinforce this principle.
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3.2 Social model of disability
The disability movement has argued that there are two 
models of disability - the medical and social models. I will consider the 
medical model in the next chapter.
The social model contends that the problems faced by those 
with impairments are caused by society rather than the impairment 
itself. This view can be clarified in the UPIAS (Union of the Physically 
Impaired against Segregation) definitions of impairment and disability.
‘Impairment is the functional limitation within the individual 
caused by physical, mental or sensory impairment.
Disability is the loss or limitation of opportunities to take part 
in the normal life of the community on an equal level with others due 
to physical and social barriers.’106
Thus the environment or society that we live, are educated or 
work in creates disability through discriminatory activities and poor 
access. This model cites problems with schools, housing, transport and 
workplaces which all contribute to disable those with impairments and 
prevent them from becoming full and productive members of society.
In chapter 1, our list of basic welfare interests included 4 
criteria of social health:
1. Capacity to engage normally in social intercourse and to enjoy 
and maintain friendships
2. Minimal income and financial security
3. Tolerable social and physical environment
4. Certain amount of freedom from interference and coercion
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If we consider how each of these are affected by society as 
seen through the social model, it could be said that society harms those 
with impairments in terms of social health. The exclusive nature of the 
special education system discourages development of social 
relationships outwith their narrow environment. Social interaction is 
further limited through poor transport and facilities for those with 
impairments to go out and meet friends. In failing to provide suitable 
education, and employment, society also does not guarantee financial 
security.
Although society tries to make amends by providing a social 
welfare state, it is argued that this in fact further disenfranchises those 
with impairments by creating a dependency on state benefits and others 
for care in their day-to-day lives.
In promoting a societal view of disability, those with 
impairments confront society with its failings and encourage it to be 
inclusive rather than exclusive. They contest that through 
improvements in housing, public buildings, transport and education 
they can become full and productive members of society. Although this 
may have initially higher costs, in the long term they would be able to 
contribute more and thus be of benefit to society.
I will now consider these various aspects of society that are 
considered disabling by advocates of the social model.
3.2.1 Education
The social model of disability encourages, indeed demands, 
inclusion in mainstream society for those with impairments. This 
inclusion begins with the education system - it is argued that special
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segregated schooling has helped to develop many of the problems 
encountered throughout life by the disabled.
One author said ‘segregated and special schools are a 
fundamental part of the discriminatory process...’107 Special schools 
discriminate in various ways. They are often far from the child’s home, 
which can create transport difficulties for their families or the child 
must be resident. This can be difficult for young children and takes 
them away from their siblings and local community.
It is also argued that the emphasis in many special schools is 
on medical intervention and therapy rather than education. This has 
two effects, firsdy it creates dependency on the medical profession and 
secondly, by reducing the spent on teaching, it contributes to the poor 
education of the disabled. Michael Oliver has argued that £If children 
are brought up to believe, through experiencing a range of medical and 
paramedical interventions, that they are ill, we cannot be surprised if 
they passively accept the sick role.’108
By providing a poor education, it is argued that special 
schools do not prepare children for life after school. They are then 
forced to accept poorly paid jobs or rely on state benefit.
The social model would say that these factors combine to 
stigmatise and discriminate those with impairments. They are removed 
from society, encouraged to become dependent and are ill prepared for 
life. The removal from society reinforces notions of difference and 
intolerance. Thus society does not come to accept the disabled or 
believe that they are capable of being part of that society.
The trend is now toward inclusive education. In America the 
Education of all Handicapped Children Act109 of 1972 mandated free, 
appropriate education for all children with disabilities.
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In the UK the Education Act of 1983 placed increased 
emphasis on inclusion but left it to the discretion of local authorities. 
There was litde change in policy but this may have been planned. Mary 
Warnock, whose report provided much of the basis for the Act, said 
‘People say we fudged integration, but we fudged it as a matter of 
policy/110
There is a new Bill to be introduced next year, the Special 
Education Needs and Disability Bill111. This will mean that schools will 
have to accept children with impairments unless ‘admitting him or her 
would harm the education of the other pupils/112 Schools must also 
make ‘reasonable adjustments to their policies and practices’113 and 
improve access to their premises.
Inclusive education does not have universal support however, 
and its success depends largely on the type and extent of impairment.
Laurent Clerc, as described in 2.3, felt that deaf children 
benefited from being educated and living together. Far from excluding 
them from society, his opinion was that through communication within 
their own community they developed better social skills and through 
education could become useful and productive members of society.
Hearing aid technology has improved greatly since Clerc was 
teaching, enabling more children to have some level of hearing, and 
making inclusive teaching more effective. But for profoundly deaf 
children inclusive teaching is not achieving its aims. A study in 1979 in 
the UK found that half of the children with profound hearing loss were 
illiterate. Despite these figures the number of schools for the deaf has 
been steadily decreasing over recent years.
In The Times114 in October this year, a grandmother of a 
profoundly deaf boy, Charlie, described his educational experience. He
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had started at a ‘normal’ school but quickly became very disruptive and 
was eventually excluded for biting a teacher. At 6 years old a place was 
found for him at a school for the deaf. Despite having to be resident 
there at such at young age, his demeanour changed completely and he 
was keen and attentive in class. The headmaster of his original school 
said that his school was not equipped to communicate with, and 
educate, Charlie in the way his intelligence demanded.’115
In America, where inclusive teaching of the deaf is 
mandatory, it has been said that ‘increased access to oral education for 
deaf children at the cost of a dramatic decrease in the quality of their 
education.’116
Thus for deaf children, particularly those congenitally deaf, 
inclusive education seems to fail them, as Clerc felt it would.
People who have attended schools for the blind have said 
that it made them feel safe and part of a community that understood 
them. Sally French, partially blind from birth, stated on attending a 
school for the blind that ‘for the first time in my life I was a standard 
product and it felt very good.’117
For those with physical handicaps other than deafness and 
blindness, such as wheelchair users, the main handicap to mainstream 
education is one of access. The new Bill will change this by requiring 
schools to improve access, but at the moment suitability of school 
premises is variable.
Those with mental handicaps will vary greatly in their 
educational needs. Mothers of severely handicapped children felt that 
the special schools their children attended were of great help.118 The 
schools provided care for their children during the day and the mothers 
felt that they taught them necessary social skills. They also had the
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necessary facilities and expertise to help the children achieve their 
potential. The emphasis here was greatly on the therapeutic and social 
value of schooling rather than education.
One of the greatest concerns of teachers and parents is that 
of inclusive education for children with behavioural problems. The new 
Bill does allow schools to refuse a child ‘if admitting him or her would 
harm the education of the other pupils.’119 If the behaviour of one child 
disrupts the whole class then this will be inclusive education to the 
detriment of the majority.
One mother whose child was in a class with a severely 
disruptive boy wrote 'is it fair that my child and others should be used 
in group therapy to try to calm this boy?’120 Although this child was 
later removed from the school and went to a special school, the mother 
still felt angry that her child and his class had 4 months of schooling 
disrupted through an experiment in inclusion.
One of the proposed solutions to the problems of inclusive 
schooling has been to have special education units within mainstream 
schools. Thus children with special needs will receive appropriate 
education for their needs and mainstream classes will not be disturbed. 
But by having the units on the same site as the main school and 
encouraging integration at breaks, children from the special unit will 
experience ‘normal’ society and the other children will mix with those 
with disabilities.
Many in the disability movement have argued that the poor 
education and exclusive nature of special schools has had a major role 
in exclusion of the disabled from society. But blanket inclusive 
education can be just as detrimental and discriminatory. It has to be the
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best and most appropriate education which enables the child to reach 
their potential that takes priority, not inclusion at all costs.
Mary Warnock said in 1988 that Integration in its widest 
sense is about how to fit special education into mainstream education 
rather than how to devise a single system of education for all.’121
3.2.2 Employment
Those who advocate the social model of disability state that 
the poor special education system has been a major factor in the poor 
employment status of many disabled people. If they leave school with 
few qualifications and poor social skills then they will only be eligible 
for poorly paid, menial work.
This then compounds discrimination in that it perpetuates the 
idea that the disabled are not capable of more qualified work. It also 
reinforces dependency on the state through low income. A study in 
1991122 stated that over 60% of the disabled population in America and 
the UK live below the poverty line.
There has been legislation to try and overcome this problem, 
especially in America where positive action has been advocated. The 
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 requires ’reasonable 
accommodation to the known physical or mental limitations of an 
otherwise qualified individual with a disability.’123
In the UK, the Disabled Persons (Employment) Act of 
1944124 required companies with 20 or more employees to employ a 
minimum of 3% registered disabled people. This bill was framed 
toward the end of the Second World War and was specifically aimed at 
disabled ex-servicemen.
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In practice however, it was rarely enforced and there was a 
system of permits which released companies from their obligation. 
Ostensibly these were for instances where there were no suitable 
disabled candidates, but they were given out freely by authorities. There 
have been only 10 prosecutions under the Act and none since 1975 
despite 80% of employers not meeting their quota.125
This system also required those with impairments to undergo 
assessment to become a registered disabled person. Many felt that this 
stigmatised them and, when the Act was not enforced, did not see any 
benefit in registration.
The sheltered workshops which were set up to provide 
employment for the disabled have now fallen out of favour. It is said 
they provide ‘unskilled and manual labour’, managerial posts are almost 
always occupied by able-bodied employees’ and ‘the wages are 
desperately low.’126 It has also been said that they ‘ghettoise disabled 
workers and restrict their employment opportunities.’127
The 1944 Act was amended as part of the Disability 
Discrimination Act (1995)128. The quota was abolished, as was the 
requirement for registration and workshops specifically for the disabled. 
Instead employers can face prosecution if they are found to have 
discriminated against a disabled person. Employers are also expected to 
‘take such steps as it is reasonable’129 to accommodate disabled people. 
These steps include adjustments to premises, altering working practices, 
allowing time off for treatment and providing training, among others.
To bring a prosecution under this Act however, it has to be 
proved that any steps required are practicable, financially feasible and 
reasonable.
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Many of the problems facing those with impairments seeking 
employment stem from a lack of awareness of their abilities. It has been 
said that ‘There is a tendency for many people, including employers, to 
equate physical disability with mental inability.’130
Those with impairments thus find themselves disadvantaged 
by their poor education and discriminatory attitudes of employers.
The disability movement has argued that only by positive 
action, as in America, will employers take on disabled workers. This can 
only be enforced through legislation, which in turn must be enforced, 
unlike the 1944 Act. The amendments to this Act in 1995 do not 
propose positive action, rather that disabled people must prove that any 
accommodation required to employ them is reasonable.
Once disabled workers are accepted, it is argued, society will 
become more aware of their abilities and attitudes will change. It will 
also in the long term relieve the welfare state of some of the burden of 
benefits as more disabled people earn enough to achieve financial 
security.
3.2.3 Social welfare
In Western societies there is a system of social services to 
provide assistance, financial or otherwise, for those unable to provide 
for themselves. Thus there is provision for those with impairments to 
assist them with various aspects of life.
In the UK there are several laws which aim to provide help 
for the disabled. These range from welfare benefits for those unable to 
work to grants to buy necessary aids or fund adaptations to housing.
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Local authorities are required to have a register of all disabled 
children in their area. They must also assess their needs and provide 
help where required. Families with disabled children are faced with 
additional costs in caring for them. These may be increased laundry 
costs, adaptations to their house, additional transport costs or a 
member of the family having to give up work to care for the child.
Although all children are assessed, the process can be lengthy 
and complicated. This delay, and the uncertainty that stems from it, can 
cause anxiety for the family. A mother that killed her 2 sons earlier this 
year, both of whom suffered from cerebral palsy, stated that one of her 
reasons for doing so was the length of time taken for community care 
assessments.131 In her case this was 8 months.
The complexity of the system also causes problems for 
families. Different grants may be administered by different departments 
and have different eligibility requirements. Many parents have reported 
that they had difficulty finding out information about all the help 
available and often did not receive all that they were entitled to as a 
result.
All of these benefits and grants require assessment of the 
child, which some may find intrusive and they may feel themselves 
under scrutiny as a family. ‘The anxiety and frustration was 
compounded because funding for many services is reassessed on a 
regular basis....so the whole procedure has to be repeated over and over 
again.’132
Families have also complained that some of the care 
provisions are not suitable to their needs. In one study they complained 
of a ‘lack of flexibility, responsiveness and creativity in service
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provision.’133 This results in them not being used, leading authorities to 
assume they are not required and discontinuing them.
The complexity of the system has now been recognised and 
attempts are being made by several authorities to provide a more 
integrated service.
In adulthood, disability benefits are available for those unable 
to work because of their impairment. It has been argued that this 
system is demeaning because of the means of assessment. In order to 
‘secure the maximum economic advantage from the benefit system, 
disabled people are forced to present themselves in the worst possible 
light.’134
The social model of disability sees these assessments as 
concentrating on the medical nature of impairment. However, 
assessment of eligibility for any benefit must be carried out and it seems 
appropriate that the medical profession is best positioned to judge the 
nature of impairments. Many authorities now employ occupational 
therapists to carry out these assessments.
If the 1995 Act does have an effect on increasing the 
numbers of disabled people in employment, then not only will this 
decrease the need for benefits, it may also provide an incentive for 
disabled people to seek employment. As a wider range of employment 
opportunities becomes available and disabled people are encouraged 
and empowered to seek better employment, dependence on welfare will 
reduce.
The provision of care has also been criticised by the disability 
movement. They have said it provides ‘services that the state thinks you 
should have or is willing to pay for, rather than those that you know 
you need.’135 Some authorities are now supplying funds direcdy to those
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with impairments so that they can directly employ such help as they 
require. This has been important in enabling people to take control of 
their own lives, and remove what has been called ‘the sullen apathy of 
dependence/136
3.2.4 Housing
In the same way that residential schools are now being 
phased out, institutional accommodation for adults with impairments is 
also being closed. The new approach is for care in the community, 
which is provided in many different ways.
For families with disabled children, community care in reality 
means that they provide much of the care themselves. As stated in the 
previous section, many families feel that provision of services is 
inadequate. There are grants available to help with any alterations which 
may be required to the home, but, as stated before, applying for these 
can be complicated and time-consuming. One commentator said 
‘getting the right adaptation requires a certain amount of knowledge 
and, often, a considerable amount of fortitude/137
There are now alternatives for adults with impairments - 
some residential homes do still exist, and there are also small hostel 
type accommodation within communities and independent housing.
The independent living movement began in 1979 with a 
group of young disabled people who were living in a Leonard Cheshire 
home. They were frustrated at their lack of control over their lives and 
started promoting various ideas for living in ‘normal’ communities. 
However, as one author has commented, ‘intention, determination and 
information was ahead of bricks and mortar/138
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There is still a shortage of suitable housing for the disabled. A 
report in 1993 said that wheelchair users rely on public sector housing 
to a greater extent than other people, not only because of their relative 
economic disadvantage, but because most housing stock is 
inaccessible.’139
It has been suggested that we should build ‘lifetime’ housing 
which is accessible to wheelchair users and is so designed that 
adaptations would be easy as the needs of the owners changed. These 
would not be notable as special housing specifically for the disabled. 
Some people have expressed a fear that having ramps outside their 
house signals to others that there is a vulnerable person living there, 
and consequently feel threatened.
Housing provision for those with disabilities is the 
responsibility of housing authorities and social services, and it can be 
confusing as to who provides what. Those with impairments need to be 
assisted and guided to obtain the best possible option for them. Various 
groups run by disabled people have been started across the country to 
provide that support, and also support for people who may be moving 
out of residential care for the first time.
As argued in the first chapter, to attain good health, people 
need to enabled and empowered to take responsibility for their own 
lives. By supporting, and having, choices in housing for the disabled 
they are enabled to take control of their day-to-day living. They are also 
able to live in a location of their choice.
By having disabled people living within ordinary 
communities, and being seen to cope with living there, it is hoped that 
people will then be able to experience the reality of living with
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disability. This will then hopefully lead to more integration and less 
discrimination for those with impairments.
3.2.5 Conclusions
The social model contends that all problems related to living 
with impairments are caused by society. They argue that society would 
be much more tolerant of disability if there was more integration 
through inclusive schooling, positive action in employment and 
improved provision of suitable housing in all communities.
These measures would not only enable those with 
impairments to become full, productive members of society but also 
increase tolerance of the population by increasing their knowledge of 
disability and dispelling the myths around it.
Undoubtedly enabling the disabled to live independently and 
receive the best education possible is a commendable aim for society. 
But some question whether all problems stem from society. Sally 
French has said ‘I believe that some of the most profound problems 
experienced by people with certain impairments are difficult, if not 
impossible, to solve by social manipulation/140
However if the problems that already exist through having an 
impairment are compounded by those caused by society then it is 
society’s responsibility to remove them. The difficulties caused through 
implementation of care in the community and the arguments about 
inclusive education show that integration is not achieved easily. It must 
be well planned and enacted if integration is to benefit everyone in 
society.
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Integration in society for the disabled may also change 
attitudes toward screening programmes. A study in America found ‘that 
when prospective parents obtain more accurate information about what 
life with disability is like, many realise that parenting a child who has a 
disability can be as gratifying as parenting a child who does not.’141
Chapter 4
4.1 Medicine as technology
Medicine as a profession has been steadily growing in stature 
since the 18th century. George Engel stated in 1977 that ‘the 
biomedical model has achieved such vast power in the early 20th 
century that it attained the status of “dogma”.’142 Now medicine is so 
technologically based that the ex-director of the WHO has said ‘ 
Everywhere it appears that health workers consider that the “best” 
health care is one where everything known to medicine is applied to 
every individual, by the highest trained medical scientist, in the most 
specialised institution.’143
The successes of medicine over this time have mainly been 
achieved through environmental measures however, not technology. 
The major infectious diseases were already on the wane before the 
discovery of vaccines and antibiotics.
In the 18th century there were some therapeutic advances 
such as Edward Jenner’s discovery of a vaccine for smallpox. There was 
also increased knowledge in obstetric care, with more doctors 
becoming involved in childbirth. Hospitals specifically for teaching 
doctors were established, but there were still few therapeutic 
interventions available. Improvements in health were mainly due to 
improving social conditions.
There was growing knowledge during the 19 th century that 
poor nutrition, sanitation and housing conditions were factors 
contributing to poor health. There was also awareness of how 
infectious diseases were spread. In 1848 a London doctor, John Snow, 
traced the source of a cholera outbreak to a water pump and halted the 
spread of the disease by stopping its use. In the same year the Public
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Health Act144 was passed which covered refuse collection and 
construction of drains and sewers among other measures. In the 
following year this was amended to include reporting of disease and 
maternity and child welfare.
These measures led to a reduction in the spread of infectious 
disease, and better housing and nutrition led to a fall in infant mortality. 
Scientific medicine also started to gain momentum as microscopes 
improved and new discoveries were made. Specialities in science were 
established and new methods of chemical analysis developed.
These analyses, combined with the development of the 
stethoscope, ability to measure blood pressure and X-rays, increased 
the diagnostic capabilities of doctors. Medicine began to concentrate on 
disease mechanisms. Awareness of the need for antiseptic conditions 
and developments in anaesthesia changed surgical practice and also led 
to improved obstetric care.
Thus technological medicine gradually became the norm and 
with new scientific advances at the beginning of the 20h century the 
mechanistic view of disease took hold.
20th century advances in bacteriology and immunology led to 
a growth in the number of diseases that could be treated or vaccinated 
against. These advances 'concentrated the activities of medical practice 
and science on the investigation and treatment of disease, perhaps at 
the expense of considering patients in their broader environmental 
contexts.’145
The development of antibiotics in the middle of the 20th 
century led to further reductions in the incidence of infectious diseases 
and a drop in maternal mortality.
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The use of antibiotics has demonstrated one of the perils of 
modern medicine. While solving problems, it has also brought with it 
new ones. Resistant strains of diseases have developed so that different, 
more powerful antibiotics have had to be produced. New treatments 
for cancer which affect the immune system of patients have also led to 
new infections.
At the beginning of the 20th century, it was found that 
biological processes could be studied and interpreted by laws of 
chemistry and physics. This led to the study of molecular biology which 
gave one of the most exciting discoveries of the century, that of the 
structure of DNA in 1953. Now most medical research is based on 
molecular biology.
Much basic research is not clinically orientated - one study146 
found that 40% of research at 2 medical schools was for no clinical 
end. Historically it has been shown however that clinical breakthroughs 
are often based on basic medical research which may have taken place 
many years before.
All of these developments have combined to create a 
dependency on medicine now. This is the opposite of the notion of 
empowerment in health that I discussed in chapter one. Many have 
argued that this has now gone too far and that people have lost the 
ability to assimilate normal life experiences. By basing medicine on 
scientific technology which many of the population may not 
understand, the ability to control their health is removed. David Cooper 
has said that technology 'erodes the traditional conception through 
shrinking our understanding of what belongs in the sphere of the 
person, of his or her accountability.’147
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With the removal of many life threatening infectious diseases 
through immunisation programmes, our expectations of health have 
also risen. David Weatherall has said that 'Forty years ago ill-health, and 
even death, was a much more common occurrence, even among young 
people, and seemed to be accepted as part of the natural course of 
things.’148 Instead the situation is now such that 'many western 
populations feel that constant rude health is their right and that they 
will go to any lengths to obtain it.’149
The major causes of death now are cancer and cardiovascular 
disease. These are often the result of environmental or lifestyle factors, 
although there is some genetic basis in certain cases.
The advent of HIV infection, and the devastation that it 
continues to cause, should act as a strong reminder that nature can 
often advance faster than medicine. Indeed one of the greatest fears 
about the epidemic was that no treatment was available. High tech 
medicine was seen to have failed and modern populations had not 
experienced that before, at least not in western countries.
This assumption that high tech medicine is the way forward 
has reached its apotheosis in the human genome project. This has been 
portrayed as the ultimate in medical control over our bodies. It will 
provide a blueprint of each individual which can then be used to tailor 
treatment.
But when the whole genome has been mapped, as has been 
achieved this year, this will only provide the basis for further research. 
In the words of David Weatherall, 'we will understand the anatomy of 
our genetic make up but will then face the extraordinarily difficult task 
of trying to find out how it works.’150
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Developments in research often take many years to reach 
clinical practice. Although the organism that causes tuberculosis was 
discovered in 1882, it wasn’t until nearly 60 years later that effective 
treatment was developed.
The knowledge that scientists have now gained is incomplete. 
It has also been argued that because genes will always mutate, indeed 
this is the basis for the theory of natural selection, our knowledge will 
never be complete. Added to this there is a great complexity in the 
interaction between different genes and also interaction between the 
environment and genes.
It is also questionable whether complete knowledge of our 
genetic make up and future is desirable. Many people who have a family 
history of Huntingdon’s Chorea, a late onset fatal disease, do not 
always want to undergo tests to find out their status. In fact this has led 
to PGD clinics being asked to keep any information about the 
treatment secret, if it would reveal the status of the patient with the 
family history.
As with Huntingdon’s, many of the genetic disorders that can 
be tested for at present, have no cure. Thus it is debatable what use the 
knowledge can be. In an American study151 of 65 genetic diseases it was 
found that nearly half of them had only completely useless treatment 
and only a quarter of them had successful treatments available.
The main use of the genetic information has been in PND 
and PGD. ‘By applying these new methods, we have been able to offer 
parents the option of terminating pregnancies...and hence allowing 
them to have normal babies.’152 It does not allow people to have normal 
children however, it just prevents them having abnormal ones.
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The use of these technologies has raised concerns that by 
enabling carriers of genetic diseases to reproduce the number of 
carriers in the population will increase. Before, asymptomatic carriers 
might not have taken the risk of having an affected child, but now the 
screening process allows them to avoid having affected children. It does 
not however prevent them from having children that carry the defective 
gene and so the incidence of that gene may rise.
As discussed in chapter one, the notion of overall health has 
many constituent parts. If we concentrate on the medical aspects to 
solve all our ills, then this is based on a narrow model of health. It 
ignores the many facets over which medicine has no control.
Thomas McKeown has argued that by concentrating on what 
is technologically possible, the real aim of medicine is lost. ‘If we are 
neither cured when we are ill nor well cared for when we are disabled, 
what is the role of medicine in which so much has been invested, in 
hope and resources?’153
There is no doubt that medical science will continue to 
pursue molecular research and much work will be carried out on the 
human genome. The benefits of this work will not be seen in clinical 
practice for a long time. The main clinical use for this research will be 
to find more and more conditions for which PND and PGD can 
screen.
One of the concerns of this elimination of genetic diseases is 
that once a test for a disease is found then research into the disease may 
not continue, as an effective ‘treatment’ is now available. There is also 
concern that practitioners ‘will specialise in the treatment of the 
treatable.’154 Thus there will be additional pressure on people to take all 
tests that are available.
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It has been argued that technological medicine has not 
delivered all that it was hoped it would. John Lantos has said that 
despite all the advances ‘the net amount of disease and suffering does 
not seem to decrease/155
The new form of medicine is also extremely expensive and as 
mentioned in 1.4 it is not able to deliver everything to everyone, despite 
the raised expectations of the population.
Through health promotion and making people more aware of 
how they can help themselves and enabling them to do so, it is argued 
that people will become more aware of their own health.
Just as in the 19th century it may be that changing 
environmental factors will prove to be the best way of improving 
general health. It has been said that ‘Biology is a common and 
convenient explanation for intractable social problems/156 In the long 
term the genome project may deliver its promised clinical advances but 
at present it is just more scientific knowledge.
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4.2 Eugenics
Plato was the first advocate of eugenic methods to improve a 
population. In his 'Republic’157, which has as its theme 'how society 
could be reshaped so that man might realise the best that is in him’158, 
he suggests regulations for the marriage and breeding of his 
'Guardians’. These included the 'rulers’, and the group of educated 
people, below the rulers and from whom the rulers were chosen, the 
'auxiliaries’, but excluded the artisans and farmers.
He noted that in breeding animals, selection of stock of the 
highest quality was used to produce improvement from one generation 
to the next, and figured that the same theory could be used to improve 
human stock. He devised a system whereby the best men and women 
would be selected by the rulers and through lots drawn, festivals of 
marriage arranged. In doing so, the population numbers could be 
controlled by the rulers, although without the knowledge of the 
guardians 'otherwise our herd of guardians may become rebellious’159.
There was also to be a system of reward so that ‘young men 
who acquit themselves well in war and other duties, should be given... 
more liberal opportunities to sleep with a wife, for the further purpose 
that.... as many as possible of the children may be begotten of such 
fathers’160. This was not to encourage promiscuity among the class, but 
to be arranged through preference for these men in the lots for the 
marriage festivals.
After birth, the children would be cared for by the state and 
'those of the inferior parents and any chidden of the rest that are born 
defective will be hidden away, in some appropriate manner that must be 
kept secret’161. These proposals appear to be that children of lesser birth
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would be relegated to the third class of craftsmen and farmers although 
there was infanticide of defective children practised at that time.
Once past the best ages for bearing children, men and 
women would be free to marry as they wished, within certain limits to 
avoid incestuous relationships, but only after the rulers ‘have exhorted 
them to see that no child if any be conceived, shall be brought to light, 
or if they cannot prevent its birth, to dispose of it on the understanding 
that no such child can be reared’162.
The utopian society thus envisioned never came to fruition, 
although there were distinct levels of society in Greece and 
intermarriage between them was not encouraged. Thus the notion of 
improvement of human society through marriage of the best people 
was seeded in the 4th century BC, and continued to some extent 
through history as class distinctions defined who was suitable for 
marriage with whom. This is plainly seen in the intermarrying of various 
European royal lines, to keep power within specific families.
The scientific practice of eugenics did not come back to 
consideration until Francis Galton wrote about it in 1883. He is 
generally considered to have coined the word ‘eugenics’ which was 
defined by him as ‘the science of improving stock, not only by 
judicious matings, but by all the influences which give more suitable 
strains more chance.’163
He noted the inequality of human beings and attributed these 
inequalities to heredity factors. In this he was influenced, as was much 
of society at the time, by Charles Darwin’s ‘The Origin of the Species’ 
which had been published in 1859. The themes of Darwin’s book made 
many think that the problems of their society could be corrected by 
social Darwinism - the basis of survival of the fittest did not work in
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such an unnatural, industrialised environment, but by manipulating the 
heredity of the population they could ensure only the fittest 
reproduced.
There was a problem in the cities at the time as 
industrialisation had led to mass migration from the country, growth of 
slums and what was seen as a concomitant growth in criminality, 
alcoholism and prostitution. The Poor Laws and the setting up of 
workhouses not only did not solve these problems but added an extra 
burden to taxpayers, so social reformers were open to any new ideas 
that could provide solutions to these problems.
Galton felt that the middle and upper classes were not 
producing enough children, and the lower classes too many, leading to 
a growth in what was then termed ‘feebleminded’ individuals. He felt 
that by selecting certain qualities, and encouraging those with such 
qualities to marry and produce children, the general intelligence of the 
population would increase. He said that ‘marriage was a social and 
eugenic duty/164 Darwin was sceptical about many of these ideas, 
saying in a letter to Galton in 1873, ‘the greatest difficulty I think would 
be in deciding who deserved to be on the [eugenic] register. How few 
are above mediocrity in health, strength, morals and intellect; and how 
difficult to judge on these latter heads/165
Gabon’s great belief was that intelligence and 
feeblemindedness were inherited and could thus easily be bred in or out 
of the population. He felt the way forward to be scientific study of data 
from families, however, and did not want to be involved in a public 
society which looked for political and social change. He thus set up the 
Eugenics Record Office, which was subsequendy renamed the
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Eugenics Laboratory, and which is still running today as the Galton 
Laboratory.
Here he worked on statistical analysis of possible hereditary 
factors, in order to work out laws of inheritance. He did observe and 
describe the normal distribution of some characteristics but was unable 
to shed any light on the heritability of talent or intelligence. He 
acknowledged that ‘the great problem of betterment of the human race 
is confessedly, at the present time, hardly advanced beyond the state of 
academic interest/166
It is of note, considering what was to be done in future years 
in the name of eugenics, that Galton never advocated compulsion, but 
hoped to convince people that eugenic breeding was a good thing for 
society. Thus he supported positive eugenics - fostering more breeding 
among the socially meritorious - rather than negative eugenics - 
encouraging the socially disadvantaged to breed less or not at all.
The actions of eugenicists in Britain and other countries 
varied enormously. In Britain and America for instance they both 
looked for sexual segregation in institutions, sterilisation and marriage 
restrictions to control reproduction of the feebleminded. In Britain 
these were all voluntary options, more or less, whereas in the States 
there was great support for legal backing and compulsion.
In 1907 the first sterilisation law was passed in Indiana167, and 
by 1917,16 states had laws, most of which gave power to sterilise 
habitual or confirmed criminals. In Iowa, they passed a law168 in 1911 
which was far more wide ranging and covered inmates of institutions 
because of drug addiction, epilepsy and sexual offences. There were 
also marriage laws in 30 states by 1914, which restricted marriage 
among the ‘unfit’ e.g. the feebleminded and those with venereal disease.
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The definition of ‘feebleminded’ was still an arbitrary matter 
and many different attempts were made to quantify intelligence. In 
1908, a French psychologist Alfred Binet started to work on tests that 
would measure mental ability, and in collaboration with Theodore 
Simon, they devised a scheme that could classify each child taking their 
test in terms of mental age. This was taken to America in 1908 and 
although it was not initially of great interest, it was used extensively 
during World War 1 amongst draftees. There was a need to be able to 
show scientifically what many in the states felt - that feeblemindedness 
was on the increase.
The problems there were similar to those in Britain at the 
time but compounded by increasing numbers of immigrants, especially 
from eastern and southern Europe. The eugenicists were mainly white, 
middle class Protestants who felt that the intelligence of the population 
was being diluted by the immigrants, but they needed evidence that this 
was so. The testing in the army proved their fears, and incidentally the 
fact that the black population were also intellectually inferior, as had 
always been thought. The facts that the tests were dependent on 
knowledge of the country and the language and that education 
depended much on the background of the individual, were passed over 
and in 1924 an Immigration Act169 was enforced, limiting the numbers 
to a small percentage of foreign-born of the same nationality in the US 
census of 1890.
Although the sterilisation laws were present, they were not 
always promoted, but a case170 came before the courts in 1924 which 
was to reinforce and encourage their use again. It involved a 17 year old 
girl named Carrie Buck who was defined as a ‘moral imbecile’. She was 
an inmate of the Virginia Colony for epileptics and feebleminded, as 
was her mother who was defined only as ‘feebleminded’. Carrie had a
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daughter whose IQ was tested and found to be of low mental age, and 
the colony ordered that Carrie be sterilised.
The evidence at the trial was less than scientific - the 
diagnosis of the daughter, who was then 7 months old, was that she 
had ‘ a look that was not quite normal.’171 The case went all the way to 
the US Supreme court where Justice Holmes regarded it as one of 
public welfare. In his opinion he stated that ‘The principle that sustains 
compulsory vaccination is broad enough to cover cutting the fallopian 
tubes’172 and just to reinforce his thoughts he added, ‘Three generations 
of imbeciles are enough.’173 Carrie was duly sterilised, but it is worth 
adding that although her child died before finishing school her ‘teachers 
reportedly considered her very bright.’174
The sterilisation rate for eugenic purposes thus rose again and 
continued to do so throughout the 30’s. Against this there was a 
growing doubt about the accuracy of the IQ tests, and genetics as a 
science was continuing to improve. During the interwar years, there was 
greater emphasis on experimentation and the application of physics and 
chemistry to sciences.
Gregor Mendel, an Austrian monk, had described the process 
of genetic transmission in 1866. He had crossed peas in the monastery 
garden and suggested that there were 2 forms of hereditary elements, 
dominant and recessive. The recessive characteristics would only be 
expressed in the next generation if 2 recessives bred together, and 
would be masked by the dominant characteristic if bred with a 
dominant. This experimental work, which forms the cornerstone of 
modern genetic transmission, was overlooked until the 30’s when it was 
rediscovered in the new age of experimental science. This rather
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discredited the eugenic theories of heritability, and led to further 
questioning of feeblemindedness.
In Britain, there was an interest in examining the causes of 
mental handicap and in 1930, Lionel Penrose was assigned a project at 
the Royal Eastern Counties’ Institution at Colchester, which at the time 
had more than 1000 patients. He noted great variation in the patients 
and eventually concluded that ‘most of the Colchester cases were in 
origin principally neither environmental, pathological, nor genetic but 
some combination of the three.’175
While he was there he made 2 interesting observations: He 
described and diagnosed phenylketonuraia (PKU) in several patients 
and, predating the modern treatment by some 30 years, suggested that 
dietary alterations could treat the disorder; He also studied the mongol 
population in great detail. This disorder had been described by John 
Langdon Haydon Down in 1866 who noted the facial appearance of 
those affected and attributed it to some genetic throwback from the 
Mongol population of Asia who he believed to be earlier versions of 
humans. Penrose looked at blood samples of the children in his study 
and noted that they showed a normal distribution of blood types, 
inferring from this that the mongol theory of genetic throwback could 
not hold. By further studying the families of the children he concluded 
that there was a connection with the age of the mother at the time of 
the pregnancy and therefore Down’s syndrome was not hereditary in a 
Mendelian sense.
In the 30’s in America there was an experiment176 carried out 
at an orphanage in Iowa, where babies were taken from mothers who 
were feebleminded, and tested for IQ. They were then put into
97
adoptive homes and normal schools and tested for several years. In all 
cases their IQ rose to within ‘normal’ levels.
Evidence such as this and Penrose’s conclusions from the 
Colchester study gave new impetus for Mendelian genetics and 
discredited eugenics as being based on unsound science.
In Scandinavian countries there was a surge in interest in 
eugenics in the 30’s and 40’s. In Sweden for instance there had been a 
Society for Racial health set up in 1909, and their ideas were popular 
before the First World War. The impetus for this came, as in America 
and Britain, from the rising costs of institutional care, special schools 
and poor relief. In Denmark it was seen as a political trade off, with 
help for those who needed it in return for them not reproducing.
In all 4 Nordic countries the majority of sterilisations were on 
the mentally retarded. The available figures show that there was an 
average of 1000 eugenic sterilisations per year in Sweden between 1942 
and 1949.
The most sinister example of eugenics taken to its extremes, 
however, was in Germany under the Third Reich. There was, as in 
other countries, great interest in the theory of eugenics around the 
beginning of the 19th century. Germany was suffering from the same 
problems of industrialisation seen elsewhere in the western world, and 
was keen to find solutions as the cost of welfare rose. Policies of health 
for the nation were promoted and doctors and scientists who were 
involved came into positions of authority to administer these policies.
After the loss of World War 1 in 1918, the country faced 
many additional crises, with food shortages meaning that many in the 
state institutions were left without while the wider population, more 
important to the national economy, were fed. There was a growing
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feeling that the German race was degenerating and that to create a 
strong country again, selective breeding among ‘good’ Germans was 
needed. This idea of being healthy for the good of the country instead 
of oneself mirrors Plato’s theories in his ‘Republic’.
The situation in Germany at this time has led one 
commentator to state that ‘virtually every aspect of eugenic thought and
practice was developed during the turmoil of the crucial years
between 1914 and 1924.’177
In the 30’s Germany suffered from an economic depression 
and concern about the state of the nation and the cost of welfare 
increased. In this environment, the Nazi party took full advantage to 
push their nationalistic ideas. There was a batde between those racial 
and social hygienists as to how best to solve the problems, but events 
under Hider quashed these debates.
In 1933 Hider’s cabinet declared a eugenic sterilisation law 
which went far beyond any of the US laws. It made sterilisation 
compulsory for sufferers of any allegedly heredity disabilities, including: 
feeblemindedness, schizophrenia, epilepsy, blindness, severe drug and 
alcohol addiction, and physical deformities that seriously interfered 
with locomotion or were grossly offensive. They called this ‘an 
exceptionally important public health initiative.’178
Within 3 years some 250,000 people were sterilised, of whom 
half were said to be feebleminded. These moves found acceptance and 
support from many doctors who had been advocating such policies 
previously. They also profited from the laws, as these were medical 
procedures for which they were paid, and they were in the majority on 
the tribunals that selected patients for sterilisation.
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In addition to this negative eugenic policy, the government 
provided loans to ‘biologically sound couples’179 to reproduce with 
some cities adding subsidies for subsequent children. Himmler formed 
the SS, a group of elite soldiers and doctors. In markedly similar terms 
to Plato’s suggestions about rewards for men who ‘acquit themselves 
well in war’180, he encouraged the members of the SS to father 
numerous children with ‘racially preferred’181 women. Again following 
Plato’s suggestion that these special offspring be looked after by the 
state, special homes were created for the confinements of these women 
- called Lebensborn.
Not all doctors and scientists agreed with the way the eugenic 
measures were carried out, but by a process of control and infiltration, 
those in agreement were supported and others pushed out of positions 
of authority. Thus the Nazi state had a biological and medical basis, but 
a ‘racial and nazified version of it.’182 In 1934 the deputy leader of the 
party said that ‘National Socialism is nothing but applied biology.’183
In 1935 the Nuremberg Laws were passed which forbade 
marriage between Jews and Gentiles, and other categories such as the 
mentally handicapped, although exemptions could be made if they had 
been sterilised. The expulsion of Jewish scientists and other 
professionals was internationally criticised, leading to further isolation 
of Germany, but there were those in the States who praised the 
sterilisation laws.
In 1937 SS medical officers gained public health powers, and 
the expansion of eugenic measures towards the ‘final solution’ began. 
The centralisation of administrative and medical powers which had 
happened over the previous years made the policies easier to 
implement. In 1938, the first policy was ‘extermination’ of new born
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and young children suffering from diseases that made their lives 
Valueless.’ This included mentally retarded and congenitally deformed 
infants, but in some instances also of those of ‘lesser races.’ Later the 
policy was expanded to include the mentally ill in institutions.
Initially these practices were secret with each ‘euthanasia 
institute’ having its own registry office to issue false certificates of 
death. There were protests from relatives which grew to include the 
general public and the churches when they realised what was 
happening. It was ostensibly dropped as a policy in 1941, but in fact 
they just moved the operation and sought to make it more it more 
efficient by building the first death camps. A year later, the categories 
were expanded further to include Jews, mixed race children and gypsies, 
no matter their state of mental health.
Once these people were regarded as degenerates akin to 
animals, the way was open for experimentation on them. The scientists 
claimed that they were working on pure scientific research, and used 
the same defence after the war.
The steady creep of the eugenic moves toward the holocaust, 
with the support of many scientists and doctors, serves as a warning to 
all involved in genetics now, as to where small shifts in policy can 
eventually lead.
It is said that these policies were based on the writings of 
Neitzsche, who created the concept of the ‘Ubermensch’184, commonly 
translated as the superman. He, however, often stated that he abhorred 
the German racist tendencies, and in fact forfeited his German 
nationality after his experience in the Franco-Prussian war. His sister, 
married to a man Nietzsche termed a ‘racial German’ with anti-Semitic 
views, was responsible for his estate after his death. She, in the eyes of
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one commentator, ‘By systematic falsification and misediting....prepared 
the way for the Nazi appropriation of Nietzsche’s thought.’185 She was 
even photographed with Hider at the house where Nietzsche spent his 
last years.
This evidence about Nietzsche was uncovered in the 50’s by 
an American Jew whose family had suffered at the hands of the Nazi, 
Walter Kaufmann. In view of the similarities between Himmler’s 
policies and Plato’s ideas of his ‘Republic’, perhaps Plato should have 
been the one to be vilified.
As the full extent of the German utilisation of eugenics 
became known, interest in the concept faded, although strangely not in 
the Scandinavian countries whose enthusiasm for eugenic sterilisation 
continued into the 50’s. Geneticists tried to establish themselves as a 
proper science and further distance themselves from eugenics.
J.S.Haldane, a British geneticist said that ‘many of the deeds 
done in America in the name of eugenics are about as much justified by 
science as were the proceedings of the inquisition by the gospels.’186 
The medical profession did not display much enthusiasm for the new 
science however as ‘if a malady was hereditary,....it must be neither 
treatable nor preventable.’187
In the 40’s and 50’s there were a series of new developments 
in the science of genetics and their analytical techniques, which led to 
major discoveries. The most important of these in scientific terms was 
the discovery of the double helical structure of DNA by Watson and 
Crick in 1953. In medical terms, the development of chromosomal 
analysis was possibly more important and in 1956 the number of 
human chromosomes was established. This was followed 2 years later
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by Lejeune’s work, where he demonstrated that Down’s syndrome 
children had an extra chromosome.
There were a few clinics established where rudimentary 
genetic counselling began - they could test prospective parents for a few 
disorders, and give informed estimates of future risk for those with an 
affected child. It was not until the advent of amniocentesis in the late 
60’s that more use could be made of the genetic information. Initially 
this test was used to identify Rhesus factor disease which could be 
treated by blood transfusion after birth, but within 10 years foetal cells 
could be cultured, leading to diagnosis of chromosomal disorders.
Medical interest in these diagnoses grew and the treatment of 
PKU was seen as a paradigm example. By screening all new borns and 
providing those affected with a special diet, the condition was treatable, 
and it was felt to be extremely cost-effective.
The passing of the Abortion Act188 in Britain in 1967 and the 
constitutional right to abortion established in America through Roe v 
Wade189 in 1973, meant that the option of testing through 
amniocentesis and abortion of affected foetuses was available to 
prospective parents.
This 'treatment’ of genetic disorders was not greeted with 
universal enthusiasm though. Lejeune, who discovered the extra 
chromosome in affected children, stating that 'Amniocentesis and 
abortion....have transformed the traditional goal of medicine from a 
cure to an attack on the patient.’190 He went on to say that he thought 
of 'trisomy-21 [the extra chromosome in Down’s syndrome] as a 
symptom of a disease. The students think of it as a symptom of 
death.’191 It was also noted that the technique as said in 4.1 would lead 
to many more carriers of genetic disease being born as their parents
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now had the freedom to reproduce with the knowledge that they could 
abort affected foetuses.
The huge growth in the number of disorders which could be 
tested for led to a growth in the number of genetic counselling centres. 
In the States they also recognised that certain disorders were 
predominant within certain ethnic groups, with Sickle cell anaemia 
prevalent amongst blacks, Tay-Sachs in Ashkenazi Jews and 
Thalassmeia in those of Mediterranean origin.
Many states made genetic testing compulsory but it was not 
always with satisfactory results. cIn practice, the sickle-cell programs, 
many of them short on follow-up counselling, often left people 
detected as carriers unnecessarily anxious about their procreational 
futures.’192 It was later seen as discriminatory, creating stigma within the 
population and against civil liberties.
In Britain because of the lesser racial mix, there was no such 
screening processes, the only one that was compulsory being the new­
born test for PKU, which is treatable condition.
The genetic counselling service is anxious, as were the 
scientists before them, to distance themselves from eugenics but there 
are cautionary signs that similar language of genetic unsuitability is 
being used today. While no one could accuse it of being in the same 
league of horror as Nazi Germany, that should always serve as a 
reminder of where excessive emphasis on genetic purity can lead.
As argued in 4.1, concentration on medical or biological 
factors has not always produced improvements in health. It has been 
said of genomics and eugenics that ‘both have taken root in a climate 
where many people believe that the large part of human talents and 
disabilities are heritable through the genes.’193
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One of the early scientists, Lionel Penrose said in 1969 that 
’he would rather live in a genetically imperfect society which preserves 
human standards of life than in one in which technological standards 
were paramount and heredity perfect.’194
We still do not know what genetic make-up creates a genius 
and Lejeune felt that the emphasis on testing and aborting, the lynch 
pin of PND, detracted from biomedical research on congenital 
disorders. In 1970, he said that he looked forward ‘to the day when a 
mongolian idiot, treated biochemically, becomes a successful 
geneticist.’195
4.3 The medical model of disability
As argued in 4.1, there appears to be a growing dependence 
on medicine in society and an intolerance of illness. This view is based 
on a narrow model of health as the absence of disease. Health, as 
discussed in chapter one, is much more complex and involves many 
different factors.
The disability movement has argued that the predominant 
way of regarding those with impairments is through this narrow, 
medical model. They would like to see a shift in opinion toward the 
social model discussed in 3.2.
They have said that ‘historical connections between hospitals 
and disabled people have helped to perpetuate the widespread belief 
that impairment is the same as in-health/196
This medicalisation of disability began with the creation of 
workhouses for those unable to earn a living. In the Poor Law 
Amendment Act of 1834 there were five categories of inmates given. 
This meant that those with impairments, ‘defectives’, were categorised 
with the sick and elderly, laying the basis for the medical view of 
disability.
In the 19th century there was a huge expansion of industry. 
This led to more people moving into cities and changed the values of 
society. Whereas work had been a part of life before and the disabled 
were tolerated within small rural communities, now ‘social fitness 
became measured by wealth.’197
More disabled people had to seek help from workhouses 
which then led to large institutions being ‘constructed to house specific 
categories of deviant groups.’198 These institutions were managed by the
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medical and nursing profession and run as hospitals with inmates 
treated as patients.
Further laws were brought in which meant that the inmates 
lost many of their rights and which ‘legalised the collection and 
retention of many disabled people/199 They also isolated the disabled 
from society, said to be for their own protection. A Royal Commission 
in 1904 stated that ‘as the family in some way created and sustained the 
defect, defectives should be removed from their families as soon as 
possible to prevent further damage and harm.’200
The growth in the eugenics movement, as described in 4.3, 
led to certain views about disability being hereditary. It also led to the 
laws in America which prevented marriage and allowed sterilisation of 
inmates such as in Buck v Bell.201 After the Mental Deficiency Act of 
1913 in the UK, there was a huge increase in the number of institutions.
It was not until the 1960’s that people began to have 
reservations about these institutions, and a number of scandals emerged 
regarding treatment of the residents which further suggested they were 
not the best way of caring for the disabled.
Now it is accepted that institutions are ‘punitive and entirely 
inappropriate’202 and the emphasis has moved to care in the community. 
There has been gradual involvement of other professionals in the 
implementation of this policy and in 1971, responsibility for the 
education of severely handicapped children was moved from the 
department of health to education.
It has been argued that the workhouses began the process of 
assessment that still persists. The aim of these assessments was to 
prevent malingerers from entering and receiving help. This same system 
of medical assessment for eligibility for state services continues and
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many feel that it is inappropriate. As I said before however, some form 
of assessment is required, but some authorities are moving away from 
solely using doctors as assessors. (p76)
Medical intervention in disability has always occurred, not all 
of it beneficially. Laurent Clerc (p60) described many strange and often 
very painful procedures he went through at school in order to cure his 
deafness. As stated in 3.2.1, many feel that the emphasis in special 
schools has always been on medical intervention to the detriment of 
education for the disabled.
Michael Oliver203 has said there four occasions when medical 
intervention is appropriate:
1. Diagnosis of impairment
2. Stabilisation of medical condition after trauma
3. Treatment of illness independent of disability
4. Provision of medical rehabilitation
Rehabilitation has its critics among the disabled, many of 
whom have undergone it themselves following accidents. They argue 
that it based on an ‘ideology of able-bodied normality.’204
But physical rehabilitation after trauma is necessary, as 
Michael Oliver admits, to regain as much functional ability as possible. 
Studies using Magnetic Resonance Imaging have now shown that the 
brain itself changes during rehabilitation. Different areas of the brain 
which had other functions can be ‘trained’ to take over new functions, a 
process described as brain plasticity.205
The disability movement argues that it is too excessive 
however and should concentrate on ‘social and personal barriers to be 
overcome, rather than any functional limitations of the individual.’206
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They would like to see a more integrated process of rehabilitation, 
which many authorities have now acknowledged and are starting to 
develop.
As Michael Oliver acknowledges, there is a need for medical 
input in the lives of disabled people. He and others argue that this must 
be appropriate and empowering, not oppressive. Doctors are part of 
the wider society and as the attitudes towards disability change there, so 
will their own. The empowerment approach to health is gaining ground 
and will undoubtedly also affect the disabled.
The role doctors play is changing and they are increasingly 
challenged by patients who want to know more about their treatment. 
As this continues the all powerful role that the disability movement 
argues doctors have over them will gradually change.
The interaction between doctors and those with impairments 
has not always been wholly successful. The past history has led many 
disabled people feeling very antagonistic towards the medical 
profession. This is perhaps not surprising given the way they have been 
treated especially through eugenic moves in the names of science, as 
seen in 4.2.
Diagnosis of specific problems in children is, as Michael 
Oliver has said, an acceptable form of medical intervention. But it is 
argued that Trorn a medical perspective, the lives of disabled children 
appear as a problem that is to be treated.’207 He has said that ‘disability 
as a long-term state is not treatable and is certainly not curable.’208
Indeed it has been argued that one of the reasons for 
medicine’s enthusiasm for PND and PGD is that it prevents the birth 
of children whose problems they cannot treat and is seen by some as 
further oppressive behaviour in the name of science.
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Society is now moving toward more integration, and 
acknowledging the rights of disabled people. Medicine will continue to 
be a part of disabled people’s lives but hopefully that interaction will 
acknowledge the wider concept of health with all that it entails, 
including empowerment of the individual and acknowledgement of 
other factors such as the environment.
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Chapter 5
The status and rights of the embryo
The most fundamental objection to PGD, and PND in 
general, is that it is always wrong to take another human life. In other 
words, all human life is sacred and all have a right to life.
There has been much discussion about when human life 
begins and which rights are applicable at what stage. Michael Bayles 
summed it up by saying ‘the underlying assumption has been that 
human beings have a right to life. Thus, when and if the foetus is 
human, it has a right to life.’209
I will consider the various stages at which human life could 
be thought to begin, the religious views and the legal position. I will 
then look at the rights that are considered to be due to humans and 
how these have developed.
5.1 The status of the embryo
The status of the preimplantation embryo has been discussed 
by many authors with regard to embryo research, In-vitro Fertilisation 
(IVF) and abortion. There are 6 proposed stages when the embryo/ 
foetus attains the status of a human being.
1. At the moment of conception, when fertilisation occurs and, in the 
words of the Church of Scotland, when ‘a genetically complete 
conceptus’210 is produced.
2. 14 days after fertilisation, when the primitive streak appears. This is 
the latest stage at which twinning can occur, so beyond this there is 
only one potential individual.
3. At the point when the nervous system starts to develop, the 
beginning of sentience. The neural tube folds develop around 20
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days after fertilisation, the cerebral cortex starts to develop around 6 
weeks, and connections in the nervous system appear at 14 weeks. 
Although the appearance of structures does not necessarily mean 
they are functioning, it is generally accepted that pain can be felt by 
the foetus around 9-10 weeks.
4. Quickening — when the mother can feel foetal movements, at 
around 19 weeks.
5. Viability — when the foetus can survive outside the womb, usually 
around 24 weeks.
6. Birth — when the baby attains a separate existence from the mother.
The first option is the one taken by many churches, with the 
majority stating that the embryo at this point is a new genetic entity and 
therefore a human being in God’s image. The Church of Scodand states 
that ‘with conception a new life begins, a new creation of God’211 and 
reinforces this by adding ‘the embryo is a potential person in that, given 
the right conditions, it becomes not something different but that which 
it already is.’212
The Catholic Church’s viewpoint, as interpreted by the 
Centre for Bioethics at the Italian Catholic University in Rome, states 
that ‘the embryo is potentially a child or a man, but it is not potentially 
a human being. That is what it already is.’213 Their basis for this is that 
‘[H]uman personhood is conferred by God in the act of creating a new 
human life.’214 Thus ‘the human embryo has the same status as a child 
or an adult and the fundamental right to life, furthermore to kill the life 
of an innocent is an especial moral outrage.’215
Given this view, one assumes that IVF, the creation of 
embryos outwith the uterus and an integral part of PGD, would be 
unacceptable, and indeed the Catholic University has stated that
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‘reproductive technologies degrade and reduce the conjugal act to a
technical act.’216 ‘Therefore all artificial procreative technologies are
condemned by the Vatican document.’217
The Church of Scotland, however, does agree with IVF so 
long as no external party’s gametes are used and appreciates that the 
technique would not be available if embryo experimentation had not 
been used in its development. They say that they ‘recognise that a 
certain latitude of judgement is to be expected among Christians.’218
The Methodist Church and the Church of England have 
taken a different approach, that of a ‘gradualist perspective that while 
the human embryo is very special, recognition of its humanness,.. ..is to 
be related to stages in its development as revealed in embryology.’219 
Thus they say that ‘until the embryo has reached the first 14 days of its 
existence it is not yet entitled to the same respect and protection as an 
embryo implanted in the human womb and in which individuation has
i >220begun.
This was also the majority view of the Warnock committee, 
whose report221 formed the basis for the Human fertilisation and 
Embryology Act222 in the UK. They decided that the cut-off point for 
research on in-vitro embryos would be 14 days after fertilisation. This 
was due to the fact that, as stated in option 2, the primitive streak 
appears at this point and is the last stage at which twinning can occur. 
They stated that there was a ‘morally significant difference between pre 
and post 14 day cells... and it is the human individual who must not be 
used for research and then destroyed.’223
They also stated that the human embryo should be accorded 
a ‘special status’224 and recommended ‘that research conducted on 
human in vitro embryos and the handling of such embryos should be
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permitted only under licence. We recommend that any unauthorised 
use of an in vitro embryo would in itself constitute a criminal 
offence.’225
If one compares the requirements for embryo research in the 
UK on humans and animals, however, there are more stringent laws 
regarding animals. Both require that one applies for a licence, stating 
the objectives of the research, and justifying the work, both have an 
overseeing authority that inspects premises and work practices and 
both require the applicant to have relevant experience. In order to carry 
out work on animals or their embryos, however, one is required to 
attend a 3 day course on welfare and law and pass an exam. There are 
no such requirements needed to work with human embryos.
Option 3 in the list is the beginning of sentience, when the 
foetus can feel pain. It has been argued that this is only appropriate 'if 
the attainment of sentience is linked to something else (like a theory of 
personhood) could it avoid the moral simplicity of saying that anything 
is licit as long as it causes no pain.’226 John Marshall also says that 'if 
the embryo is thought to be a person, in the sense of someone who 
cannot be used as a means to an end, the fact that what is being done 
can be done without pain, becomes an irrelevance.’227 Thus sentience is 
only relevant as the beginning of human life if it is thought to be a 
prerequisite for being human.
Quickening, option 4, was the ancient view of the start of 
human life. Before microscopic analysis of embryonic development and 
ultrasound, this was the first sign of foetal life. In law, this was when 
punishment for death of the foetus became manslaughter. Aristotle’s 
view was that the foetus gradually acquired 'ensoulment’228. Thus it 
went from ‘a vegetative existence’ to the later foetus, 'resembling a little
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animal’ and with ‘a sensitive soul’ and finally to the fully formed foetus, 
‘recognisably human’ and with ‘a “rational” or “intellectual” soul.’229
Viability, the next option, was supported in the case of Roe v 
Wade in the states. In considering the limitations for abortion the court 
stated ‘the compelling point [for the state to take an interest] is at 
viability. This is because the foetus then has the capacity of meaningful 
life outside the mother’s womb. State regulation protective of foetal life 
after viability thus has both logical and biological justifications.’230
Birth is an obvious standpoint, as at this point a separate 
being is present. This is the view of Jewish religious thought ‘on one 
fundamental principle there is complete agreement: full human status is 
not acquired until birth.’231
This is also the point at which the foetus attains legal status in 
the UK. This can also be retrospective, but the foetus has no legal 
rights unless it is born alive. It is accorded protection in utero from 
injury by third parties and can claim after birth for prenatal injury. In 
practice, as discussed in 1.3, the claims are usually only successful if 
brought by the parents.
All of these options appear to assume different qualities 
necessary to be a human. Thus to agree with 1, one has to decide that a 
new genetic entity is all that is required to be human. This individuality 
is also continued with the 14 day rule, when twinning is no longer 
possible. The ability to feel pain is not solely a human characteristic as 
animals also have this ability.
The stage of quickening is when the presence of another 
being is felt by the mother, but now, with the widespread use of 
ultrasound, foetal movements can be seen, if not felt, at much earlier 
stages.
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Viability is said to be when the foetus can survive outside the 
womb, but this is not really the case. A 24 week foetus can survive but 
usually only with a great deal of medical assistance. Even after birth, a 
baby cannot fend for itself, requiring outside help for many years.
It has been said that ‘there is one presupposition that all of 
these positions have in common. It is that there is an objectively correct 
answer to this question.’232
The argument about when human life begins is ongoing and, 
because many opinions are based on religious beliefs, is fiercely 
contested. It is difficult to pin down an exact moment when an embryo 
becomes a person but I would agree with Aristotle’s view that as the 
foetus grows, so does its status as a person.
Society would also seem to agree with this view in that most 
people support the right to abortion. As with the abortion law, 
however, the view changes with regard to the length of the pregnancy, 
so that later abortions are seen as justified only in exceptional cases.
5.2 Human Rights
Mary Warnock said that ‘if it can shown that the embryo is a 
person then it will follow that it has rights for certainly all persons have 
rights and it is sometimes held, only persons have rights.’233 These 
rights are not just legal rights but moral rights. Morris Cranston said
that ‘A human right by definition is a universal moral right,.....
something which is owing to every human being simply because he is 
human.’234
Historically the idea of universal moral rights of humans 
dates back to the natural law of the Greeks. They said this was ‘a law to 
which everyone had access through individual conscience.’ 235 In order 
for this law to be applicable they had to explore what qualities humans
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had that made them different from other animals. Aristotle said that 
human beings ordered their actions in the light of rational 
understanding and that this rationality was the defining quality of being 
human.
The idea of moral rights for humans was continued by the 
Romans who enshrined them in a legal system. The moral theme of 
these rights was continued by the spread of Christianity. Both of these 
views created ‘ a relationship between a human being and his or her 
conscience.’236
The concept of rights for man was later expounded by 
philosophers such as John Locke who wrote of rights to life, property 
and liberty. These rights were also part of the Declaration of 
Independence of both France and the United States.
Feinberg has said of these rights, a ‘man has a moral right 
when he has a claim, the recognition of which is called for not 
necessarily by legal rules but by moral principles or the principles of an 
enlightened conscience.’237
He has also said that if ‘one wishes to say one has rights, then 
one must accept certain duties that go with those rights, certain 
obligations and it has been stated that one can only insist on rights if 
one can lay claim to them.’238 If this is the case then the foetus and 
certainly the embryo cannot have these rights as they are unable to lay 
claim to them. They deserve to have what Warnock referred to as a 
‘special status’ but not full rights. They are not full human beings, and it 
could also be argued that neither are young babies in that they cannot 
exhibit rational thought or claim their rights.
Jonathan Glover has listed certain criteria that must be met in 
order to have a right. These are that ‘must already exist’ ‘at a level of
117
development where you can have the relevant desires’ and one ‘must 
have the desire whose satisfaction is in question/239
Again neither the embryo nor the foetus could be said to 
satisfy these criteria, and the ‘level of development’ criteria also 
precludes babies and small children. This would seem to suggest that 
rather than attaining full human status with all its attendant rights 
during foetal development, it is not until much later, well after birth, 
that this happens.
It has been said that to ‘argue that neither the embryo or the 
foetus is a bearer of rights is not to leave it without protection. We have 
duties towards it, because there is a strong presumption in its favour.’240
5.3 Conclusions
So the embryo at the stage when PGD is carried only has a 
status as a person in the eyes of the Catholic Church. The Church of 
Scotland has not condemned PGD, only raised doubts about its safety.
In terms of having human qualities that would confer rights 
on it, there is no question that an embryo has any such qualities. The 
changing status through time and growth as suggested by Aristotle 
seems to be the most acceptable view to the majority. Thus PGD is an 
acceptable technique in society, and may even be preferable to PND 
and later termination.
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Conclusions
As discussed in Chapter 1, assessment of health and well­
being is difficult, and value laden, in people already alive. The ability to 
predict it in those not yet born is almost impossible. As I said, these 
judgements are not made in isolation, they are value judgements which 
will derive from personal experience, clinical advice and societal 
attitudes. Any decision in PND or PGD for prospective parents will 
involve all of these factors.
The legal cases discussed in 1.3 will undoubtedly also 
influence clinicians — they do not want to be sued and so will be under 
pressure to provide all the tests they can. Patients will also be aware of 
these cases through media coverage. They imply that having a 
handicapped child is expensive and the need for compensation 
indicates that social welfare does not fully provide.
The very presence of testing during pregnancy influences 
decisions. If it’s there it must be for a good reason and to provide 
benefit to the patient. Medical opinion is still highly regarded and their 
message is that parents must do the best for their babies, be that not 
eating certain foods or taking all available tests. As the tests are now an 
integral part of the antenatal service, the time given to discussion of 
tests and their consequences may be limited as they will be seen as the 
norm.
The media also influences societal attitudes. This year there 
were scare headlines regarding a screening programme in Sheffield.241 It 
was portrayed as terrible that errors were made and 4 children with 
Down’s syndrome were born as a result. Other mothers were 
interviewed on television and said that their pregnancies had become a 
nightmare because of the extra anxiety. Thus the message is given that
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having a baby with Down’s syndrome is a horrific experience to be 
avoided at all costs.
The combination of all these influences give out the message 
that handicap is horrific and that responsible people take advantage of 
all screening tests to abort all affected pregnancies.
As more and more £genes for’ are discovered, we are led to 
believe that this will benefit us all. In fact medical uses, apart from 
testing and aborting or PGD, will take many years to reach clinical 
practice. These scientific advances are not value neutral and can be used 
in many different ways, good or bad. The claims of scientists and 
doctors in Nazi Germany are there to remind everyone of the practices 
that science can be used to justify.
It is admirable to try and stop pain and suffering but 
assessment of another’s pain and suffering is very difficult. If 
eradication of dreadful disease is the aim of PND and PGD, then we 
need to step back and consider what are dreadful diseases and why we 
consider then to be so. Is it dreadful for the sufferer, the parents, the 
doctor who cannot treat it or society who has to pay for their care?
As I argued in Chapter 1, suitable candidates for PGD could 
be those that cause unmanageable pain, complete lack of intellectual 
acuity or where there is a limited ability to medically treat. Embryos 
may not have the status of a human being but that should not allow us 
to discard them for trivial reasons.
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